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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SEEKING MEANINGFUL NONPROFIT REFORM IN A POST
SARBANES-OXLEY WORLD

DANNÉ L. JOHNSON*
PRELUDE
John’s Morning

1

I don’t like her. I am smart and I do not forget. I do remember. At 8
o’clock I eat my first meal today that was fruit loops with sugar and milk. No
bananas, where are the bananas. I make it myself.
I was at the table in my room and Nathan, my friend, came to share. We
eat and laugh. At 9 o’clock I brush my teeth. 1. Water, 2. toothpaste, 3. spit,
4. drink, and I can watch TV. But my TV don’t work. I go to the big room
downstairs for TV. I am first. I see my show and I sit in the big chair. It is not
too quiet. I want quiet. Lots of talking. My show is funny. I laugh. No one
makes me quiet. They can’t see me.
I want an apple. No apple. Where is the apple? I get a tuna fish on bread.
Lunchtime. Not so good. Miss Lisa make me eat and I make a happy plate. I
want more. Miss Lisa say I will get a snack if I go and get dress. I want my
apple.
All by myself I get dressed, I can do it. 1. Underwear clean, 2. undershirt,
3. shirt, 4. shorts. I go back for my apple. Miss Lisa my apple? No answer. I
am hungry. My apple. My apple. I talk loud. Listen to me. My apple.
I wait. Count 1, 2, 3, 4. Miss Lisa walk away. I tell Miss Tina my apple.
She mad at me. She say I not smart. She mean. I remember my apple. I don’t
get nothing.
*

*

*

*

* Associate Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of Law; former Chairperson of
the Board of Directors of one of the largest nonprofit organizations in New York. The author
wishes to thank friends and colleagues whom she met while working as a nonprofit board
chairperson including John Courtney, Co-Founder, Partnership for Family Supports and Justice at
the Fund for Social Change, and Bonda Lee-Cunningham, Director, Members Services,
Federation of Protestant Welfare Agencies. She would also like to thank Anahaita N. Kotval,
Managing Director and General Counsel, RBS Global Banking and Markets Americas, former
Oklahoma City University School of Law students, Siobhan Barbee Acker, and Amy Buehrle, for
research assistance, and Oklahoma City University for its support during the writing process.
1. John is a fictional character.
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This is just a short part of John’s narrative about his life as a mentally
retarded adult living in an independent living facility. John is ignored and left
to his own devices from the time that he awakes until one in the afternoon.
John’s experiences are typical, but they should not be. He is vulnerable to the
facility’s other residents, staff, and third party providers. People do not
properly attend to John’s needs, and his interaction and activity levels are low.
In New York, the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities (“OMRDD”) states its mission to be:
[T]o develop programs to further the prevention and early detection of mental
retardation and developmental disabilities; to develop a comprehensive,
integrated system of services which has as its primary purposes the promotion
and attainment of independence, inclusion, individuality and productivity for
persons with mental retardation and developmental disabilities; to serve the
full range of needs of persons with mental retardation and developmental
disabilities by expanding the number and types of community-based services
and developing new methods of service delivery; and to improve the equity,
effectiveness and efficiency of services for persons with mental retardation and
developmental disabilities by serving persons in the community as well as
those in developmental centers, by improving the conditions in developmental
centers, and by establishing accountability for carrying out the policies of the
2
State with regard to such persons.

*

*

*

*

Jeffery’s Afternoon3
I’m going to run right out to Starbucks for a venti caramel latte with no
foam. It’s three in the afternoon and I just need to hang in here for a few more
hours then I’m off to my board meeting. It’s funny how I got hooked up with
the board in the first place. I’m thirty and looking for meaning in my life; I
wanted to work in the community and to use my education for good. I’m a dogooder.
After I took a course on how to be a board member, I was placed on the
board of a nonprofit agency that focuses on child development and other
things. There are numerous programs and sites. I have been on the board for
two years, and I still don’t know all of the stuff that we do. The board meets
three times each year, and we have a killer holiday party. We always get a
band, and the food is always great. Sometimes we invite donors.
I respect and totally trust the CEO. Matt founded this agency fifteen years
ago, and he has a tremendous vision of growth and opportunity. The people in
the agency seem like they know what’s going on. They have been able to get

2. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 13.01 (2006).
3. Jeffery is a fictional character.
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all sorts of state and federal contracts so that we can accommodate these
programs.
As might be expected, we have an auditor who keeps track of the money,
and we have several bank accounts. I am on the fundraising committee, and
the other board members are really nice. They have been around much longer
than me. When we meet, we spend time catching up with one another.
Everyone always wants to know what cases I’m working on. I ask them about
their children and their jobs. Matt’s a great leader; I guess he just needed a
lawyer from Wall Street to make the agency look good. So, here I am: smart,
good-looking, single, a scratch golfer, and an attorney to boot.
*

*

*

*

Jeffery and the other board members are ultimately responsible for guiding
Matt’s agency and ensuring that John receives quality services. Jeffery does
not know John and seems to have limited knowledge about the agency. Jeffery
is young and enthusiastic about service. He is certainly smart, but is failing at
his responsibility as a board member.
Jeffery might be surprised to know that the agency manages a budget of
thirty-three million dollars per year. These funds are restricted funds from
city, state, and federal sources. Each funding dollar is allocated. Matt’s best
friend is the accountant and he has been with the agency since it was founded,
fifteen years ago. The agency operates ten day cares and several residential
facilities for people in the community with mental disabilities.
Jeffery would also be surprised to know that recently the agency has come
under fire from the Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental
Disabilities (“OMRDD”). A tour of the facility where John lives revealed that
there was a lack of security, frequent inappropriate visitation among the
residents, misappropriation of resident funds, and no lock on the medicine
cabinet. Matt entered into a corrective action plan with OMRDD to cure these
deficiencies and others in an effort to retain this lucrative government contract
to provide services, without which the agency might not be able to meet its
payroll.
How could Jeffery know these things; should he; and how can he and the
other board members respond to this situation? Can the gap between John,
service client, and Jeffery, a board member, be closed?
INTRODUCTION
Corporate scandals have unfolded before our eyes. The loss of pensions,
corporate collapse, and subsequent prosecutions followed as the fallout of
these transgressions. The ethical and accountability crisis in the corporate
sector is not isolated. The personalities, ethical challenges, profiteering, and
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general lack of accountability and moral leadership found in the corporate
setting plague all of society.
Cross-pollination among corporations, charities, and small business,
through savvy board members and executives, spreads corporate ethical norms
and practices, both good and bad. As a result of a number of highly publicized
nonprofit scandals in recent years, many commentators are suggesting that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”), a body of legislation adopted
to stem the tide of corporate scandal, could be a possible solution to the
nonprofit woes.
In this Article, I suggest that strong, ethical, and transparent nonprofit
board governance, influenced by Sarbanes-Oxley, can strengthen nonprofits.
But at the same time, some of the law’s rigorous reforms are not appropriate
for all nonprofits. Part I examines the role and strength of nonprofits in
American society and the duties of nonprofit boards. Part II discusses the
environment that gave rise to Sarbanes-Oxley and reflects on the criticism and
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley. Part III explores nonprofit scandals and their
similarity to past corporate scandals in terms of impact and the regulatory
response that followed. Part IV provides guidance to nonprofits considered in
light of Sarbanes-Oxley requirements.
I. NONPROFITS IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
A.

Nonprofits in the American Economy

Nonprofit agencies play a significant role in the United States. There are
legal distinctions between the different types of nonprofit organizations, such
as charitable and noncharitable, as well as different reporting requirements for
each.4 These organizations primarily pursue social welfare missions, providing
care for those members of society who cannot provide for their own wellbeing.5 These charitable sentiments, and possibly also the birth of the modern
nonprofit sector, date back to eighteenth century Europe as a religious and
social method to address the impact of the Industrial Revolution.6 Before the

4. Many nonprofit agencies can apply to the IRS for an exemption from federal income
taxes. I.R.C. § 501 (2006).
5. Other nonprofits care for animals, encourage conservation, provide legal services, and a
host of other good deeds. I.R.C. § 501(c) (2006).
6. The YMCA was founded in 1844 in London to channel young men away from
unhealthily pastimes and toward educational, religious, social, or physical pursuits. YMCA,
History of the YMCA Movement, http://www.ymca.net/about_the_ymca/history_of_the_
ymca.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). In 1863, the Red Cross was founded. ICRC, Discover the
ICRC, 3–6 (2005), http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/p0790. The International Red
Cross is a highly-respected humanitarian assistance organization that delivers rapid relief to
societies affected by natural or man-made disasters. Id. at 3. The first nonprofit organization in
the United States predates these social services organizations noted above. In the 1600s, the
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founding of the United States, early North American settlers formed churches,
orphanages, schools, and other voluntary associations to address social ills.7 In
1831, Alexis de Tocqueville lauded this American impulse to establish such
organizations throughout the land.8
While nonprofits have a long history in the United States, currently,
nonprofit entities are divided broadly into two types: (1) charitable or publicservicing9 and (2) noncharitable or member-servicing organizations.10 As
established by the Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) organizations are
divided into two smaller categories: public charities and private foundations.11
A study by the Public Agenda, however, found that most donors define the
nonprofit sector work almost exclusively as the work of charitable, humanservice organizations.12 The IRS defines certain organizations as “charitable”
because they serve broad public purposes, including educational, health,
charitable, religious, scientific, and literary activities, as well as the relief of
poverty and other public benefit actions.13 This status permits donations to
charities to be tax-deductible for the donor.14 Between the late 1960s and the

clergy and the Massachusetts corporation struggled to govern the Harvard. JOSIAH QUINCY, THE
HISTORY OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY 1, 4 (1840). These struggles set the tone for the roles of
directors and board governance and were instrumental in establishing the duties of boards.
7. Paul Arnsberger et al., A History of the Tax-Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective, SOI
Bull., Winter 2007–08, at 105, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/tehistory.pdf.
8. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 596 (Penguin Books 2003).
9. Charitable nonprofits are most often characterized as “public service” organizations, and
are recognized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). See also Arnsberger et al., supra note 7, at 105.
Contributions to these organizations are tax deductible. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
10. Noncharitable nonprofits have also been described as “mutual benefit” organizations,
and include, but are not limited to, labor unions, social clubs, chambers of commerce, and other
organizations that could be characterized as promoting the interests of their members. Arnsberger
et al., supra note 7, at 106. These organizations are recognized for tax purposes under I.R.C. §§
501(c)(4)–(23) (2006). Donations to these organizations, with few exceptions, are not tax
deductible. See id. § 501(a).
11. Private Foundations are divided into operating private foundations (spending resources
on charitable purposes) and nonoperating private foundations (engaged in grant making).
Arnsberger et al., supra note 7, at 110.
12. Ana Maria Arumi et al., Summary of Findings, in THE CHARITABLE IMPULSE 5 (Public
Agenda, New York, N.Y. 2005). Donors seemed indifferent to foundations and surprised or
resentful that hospitals and other large organizations that charged fees and made profits could be
categorized as nonprofits. Id.
13. I.R.S. Dept. of the Treasury Publication 557, Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization,
at 19 (Rev. June 2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf.
14. 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2006).
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late 1990s, the number of nonprofit organizations in America grew
dramatically.15
NONPROFIT STATISTICS IN THE UNITED STATES16
1975

1985

1995
1,066,808

2000
1,211,937

2005
1,514,821

571,511

720,877

1,069,719

a. Registered
Public Charities

514, 865

642,137

956,760

b. Registered
Private
Foundations
Filing Charitable
§501(c)(3
Organizations)

56,646

78,740

112,959

REGISTERED
NONPROFITS
Registered
Charitable
§501(c)(3
Organizations)

a. Filing Public
Charities
b. Filing Private
Foundations
Registered
Noncharitable
§§501(c)(4)-(23)
Filing
Noncharitable
§§501(c)(4)-(23)

108,937

137,620

228,848

296,897

366,150

82,048

106,449

180,931

230,159

286,615

26,889

31,171

47,917

66,738

79,535

492,438

489,791

443,464

138,149

The modern nonprofit sector is viewed very favorably overwhelmingly by
Americans. The nonprofit sector operates on the principles of voluntary
service and community support through time and money. Volunteerism is not
uniquely American, but the diversity of services offered and the extent of

15. There are at least three factors that help explain nonprofit sector growth over this time
period: (1) Increasing American affluence, (2) federal subsidies associated with Lyndon
Johnson’s Great Society programs, and (3) the Civil Rights Movement. David C. Hammack,
Introduction: Growth, Transformation, and Quiet Revolution in the Nonprofit Sector Over Two
Centuries, 30 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 157, 165 (2001).
16. These totals may not be exact due to rounding. This chart was created by a tablegenerating website. See generally Nat’l Center For Charitable Stat., NCCS All Registered
Nonprofits Table Wizard, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/tablewiz/tw_bmf.php (last visited Jan. 11,
2010) (providing documentation of statistics regarding growth in nonprofit organizations).
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public support is impressive.17 Approximately 90% of American families
contribute to charity, and donated an average of $1,620 each in 2001.18 In
2006, individuals, corporations, and foundations gave $295 billion in
charitable contributions to nonprofits.19 Donors generally do not expect to
receive benefits from their donations, but they do anticipate that their funds
will be used to support the mission of the organization.20 Not only do
Americans support nonprofits financially, over forty-four million, or nearly
22% of adults, give their support by volunteering.21
In 2005, the IRS recognized roughly 1.4 million nonprofit organizations,
public charities, and private foundations—and that is not counting nearly half
of the church congregations (approximately 175,000) that choose not to
register with the IRS.22 Most nonprofit organizations registered with the IRS
are public charitable organizations and exempt from taxes under Section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.23 Approximately one-third of these
registered organizations, however, must report their financial data to the IRS.24
Religious organizations and entities with less than $25,000 in gross receipts are
not required to report data to the IRS.25

17. According to the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, the value of
volunteer work in the U.S. is $109 million, leading both Germany and France with $48.4 million
and $41.9 million respectively. The John Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, tbl.2
(2004), http://www.ccss.jhu.edu/pdfs/CNP/CNP_table201.pdf. Additionally, the U.S. ranks
fourth for people volunteering with 44.5 million, or 22% of all adults. Id. Norway (52%), United
Kingdom (30%), Sweden (28%), and Uganda (23%) lead the U.S. for percentage of adult
population volunteerism. Id.
18. INDEPENDENT SECTOR, GIVING & VOLUNTEERING IN THE UNITED STATES: KEY
FINDINGS 1, 3 (2001), available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/GV01keyfind.pdf.
19. KENNARD T. WING ET AL., THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2008, at 70 (2008). In 2005,
individuals, corporations, and foundations gave $260 billion in charitable contributions to
nonprofits. THE URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: FACTS AND FIGURES FROM
THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 2 (2006), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311373_
nonprofit_sector.pdf.
20. Arumi, supra note 12, at 10. Many donors anticipate that they will receive a tax benefit
from their donation in addition to the personal gratification from doing good. WING ET AL., supra
note 19, at 1.
21. LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 297 tbl.A.2 (2004).
22. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 139.
23. See id. at 139–40 tbl.5.1; 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Other types of tax-exempt
organizations include social welfare organizations, labor and agricultural associations, business
leagues, and fraternal beneficiary societies. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 501(c)(4)–(6), 501(c)(8).
24. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140.
25. Id. at 140 tbl.5.1.
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The financial impact of the nonprofit sector is significant.26 In 2005, all
reporting nonprofits had assets in excess of $3.4 trillion and spent
approximately $1.4 trillion.27 Contributions from individuals and major
corporations support these nonprofits. Each year several studies are conducted
to determine their economic impact.28 A 2005 study of the nonprofit arts and
culture industry suggests that this sector spends $63.1 billion dollars per year
and generates more than $103 billion in additional economic activity.29
In 2005, public charities reported nearly $1.1 trillion in total revenues, $2
trillion in total assets, and $1.1 trillion in total expenses.30 Of the nearly $1.1
trillion in total revenues, 21.3% came from contributions, gifts, and
government grants, and 70.3% came from fees for goods and services, which
consist of tuition payment and hospital patient revenues, including Medicare
and Medicaid.31 Nonprofits accounted for over 8% of all wages and salaries
paid in the United States in 2005.32 In 2004, nonprofits paid $321.6 billion in
wages, compared to $355.8 billion in wages paid by the finance and insurance
sectors combined.33 In 2005 and 2006, nonprofits accounted for 5% of gross
domestic product.34

26. In 2007, the largest public charity was the President and Fellows of Harvard College,
with approximately $57.9 billion in total assets. National Center for Charitable Statistics, NCSS Display Largest Public Charities, http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/showTopOrgs.php
(follow “All Orgs.” under “Total Assets) (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). The top ten largest public
charities in 2007 had approximately $237.9 billion in total assets. Id.
27. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1.
28. See, e.g., LESTER M. SALAMON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVIL SOC’Y STUDIES
& FLORIDA PHILANTHROPIC NETWORK, FLORIDA’S NONPROFIT SECTOR: AN ECONOMIC FORCE,
available at http://www.jhu.edu/ccss/research/ned/pdf/florida_report_final_3.18.08.pdf; PUBLIC
SECTOR CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF FLORIDA NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: A RESOURCE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD (2002), available at http://www.pnlc.
rollins.edu/FloridaCompositeReport2002-04-22.pdf.
29. AMERICANS FOR THE ARTS, ARTS & ECONOMIC PROSPERITY 6, 9 (2008), available at
http://www.artsusa.org/pdf/information_services/research/services/economic_impact/aepiii/nation
al_report.pdf. “Nationally, the nonprofit arts and culture industry generates $166.2 billion in
economic activity every year—$63.1 billion in spending by organizations and an additional
$103.1 billion in event-related spending by their audiences.” Id. at 3.
30. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1. These numbers represent reporting
nonprofits that have more than $25,000 in gross receipts and are required to file with the IRS. Id.
In 2004, public charities reported nearly $1.1 trillion in total revenues and $981 billion in total
expenses. THE URBAN INST., supra note 19, at 3 tbl.2.
31. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 143–45.
32. Id. at 20.
33. LESTER M. SALAMON & S. WOJCIECH SOKOLOWSKI, JOHNS HOPKINS CTR. FOR CIVIL
SOC’Y STUDIES NONPROFIT EMPLOYMENT DATA PROJECT, EMPLOYMENT IN AMERICA’S
CHARITIES: A PROFILE 3 (2006), available at http://www.jhu.edu/ccss/research/pdf/Employment
%20in%20Americas%20Charities.pdf.
34. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 20.
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In the United States, the nonprofit sector is a major employer, employing
more people than utility, wholesale trade, and construction industries
combined.35 This workforce segment is comprised of 9.4 million paid and 4.7
million unpaid volunteers, equaling 10.5% of the total U.S. workforce.36 In
addition, the nonprofit sector plays a leading role in the fields of health and
hospital care, social assistance, and higher education.37
In Florida, nonprofits are the fourth largest employment sector, providing
630,000 jobs as of the second quarter of 2005.38 In Miami-Dade County,
Florida, nonprofits are the third-largest employment sector, providing 76,741
In Iowa, charitable nonprofit employment is the fifth-largest
jobs.39
employment sector, providing approximately 129,000 jobs in 2005.40 Between
2002 and 2004, while employment overall was down by 0.2%, employment in
the nonprofit sector increased by 5.3% for paid and volunteer workers.41 The
annual budget of the entities that compose the nonprofit sector in the United
States, such as the private sector, public sector, and nonprofit organizations,
surpasses the national budgets of nearly every other country in the world.42 In
2005, all reporting nonprofits declared combined revenue of $1.6 trillion.43
Nonprofits are an integral part of American society. These organizations
provide services, employ many people, and contribute to the national economy.
Considering the impact that nonprofits have on the economy, it is surprising
that the majority are managed by volunteer boards of directors working with
nonprofit staff.
A.

Directors and Their Role in Nonprofits

State law divides corporations into profit, or “for-profit” corporations, and
nonprofit, or “not-for-profit” corporations. A for-profit corporation, generally,
is a legal entity incorporated in the state where part of the income or profit is
35. SALAMON & S. SOKOLOWSKI, supra note 33, at 3.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 33.
39. DADE CMTY. FOUND., SECTOR OF IMPACT II: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NONPROFITS IN
MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2, 5–6 (2006), available at http://www.dadecommunityfoundation.org/
Site/docs/2006%20Sector%20of%20Impact.pdf.
40. JILL SMITH ET AL., UNIV. OF IOWA & IOWA DEP’T OF ECON. DEV., THE IMPACT OF
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON IOWA’S ECONOMY & QUALITY OF LIFE 4, 15
(2007), available at http://www.iowalifechanging.com/downloads/char_giving_report_FINAL02-01-2007.pdf.
41. SALAMON & S. SOKOLOWSKI, supra note 33, at 6.
42. Dorothy D. Freeman & Michael R. Payne, The Billion Dollar Impact: Kent County
Profits in 1999, http://www.gvsu.edu/cms3/assets/C6EE62EC-E0C1-54F2-D0212D5174A27DA
F/pdf/billiondollar.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
43. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 140 tbl.5.1.
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distributable to its members, directors, or officers.44 In other words, the
primary goal of a for-profit corporation is to make a profit. A profit is a
tangible or pecuniary benefit such as dividends, interest, capital accounts, or
salaries—or it may be a saving of expense which one would otherwise incur.45
A not-for-profit corporation is a legal entity incorporated in the state, where no
part of the income or profit is distributable to its members, directors, or
officers. Unlike the revenue driven goal of for-profit organizations, nonprofit
organizations exist for reasons other than monetary gain.
Both for-profit and not-for-profit corporations require a board of directors.
Directors are “person[s] appointed or elected to sit on a board that manages the
affairs or a corporation.”46 The board of directors is a governing body that
should reflect a spectrum of public interests and be responsible for
management and operation of the corporation. There are three ways to select
directors.47 First, the members of the organization can elect directors from a
list of candidates.48 Second, directors may be selected through the use of a
self-perpetuating process.49 Under this system, the existing board members
can elect or re-elect directors.50 Third, and finally, directors may serve “ex
officio by virtue of holding another position, such as chief executive of the
corporation, or officer of an affiliate organization or constituency group.”51
Directors, once on the board, can be assigned roles and advance in terms of
board leadership based on their status, seniority, or affiliation.52 At the
meetings, the board can take action in two ways.53 One, it may hold a meeting
with a quorum,54 meaning a meeting with a minimum number of the members
present and voting.55 Two, it may act with written consent of the voting
directors.56
Generally, boards are engaged in monitoring management, approving
major transactions, and giving direction to the organization. Both types of

44. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 367 (8th ed. 2004).
45. See M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Nonprofit Purposes and Character Which Warrant
Creation of Nonprofit Corporation, 16 A.L.R.2d 1345, 1347–48 (2004).
46. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 492–93 (8th ed. 2004).
47. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS 4 (George W. Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS, supra note 47, at 5–6.
53. LISA RUNQUIST, THE ABC’S OF NONPROFITS 81 (2005).
54. Id.
55. Bylaws of organization can provide alternative calculations for a quorum. David M.
Bardsley, Committees, in NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 127 (Victor Futter et al.
eds., 2002).
56. RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 81.
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boards, for-profit and nonprofit, are guided by similar legal principles,
involving the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.57 Courts presume that
directors have specialized skill and knowledge to manage the affairs of
organizations, and would rather not substitute their judgment for that of their
boards when legal disputes arise.58 The Business Judgment Rule protects
individual directors from personal liability when making board decisions in
good faith and with due care.59 The rule presumes that, in the absence of selfinterest, directors act in good faith and with due care,60 and courts need not
perform a “substantive review of the merits of a business decision made by
directors acting without self-dealing and in good faith and with due care.”61
While the Business Judgment Rule is a safe harbor from director liability,
it is not absolute.62 In cases of self-dealing,63 a failure to act,64 or where action
or inaction is shown to be a gross abuse of discretion,65 directors cannot rely on
the protection of the Business Judgment Rule.66 All boards have two legal
duties to the corporation: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.67 Nonprofit
boards have a third additional legal duty to the corporation: a duty of

57. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19.
58. Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989).
59. See EDWARD BRODSKY & M. PATRICIA ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE, OFFICERS,
AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES & LIABILITIES § 2:10 (2009) (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539
A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988)), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir. 1986); Fischel &
Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 283–84 (1986).
60. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:10.
61. Id. (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A.2d 770, 780–781 (Del.
Ch. 1988)), appeal denied, 540 A.2d 1089 (Del. 1988), appeal denied, 540 A.2d 1088 (Del.
1988); Matter of Munford, 98 F.3d 604 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1068 (1998)
(applying Georgia law) (“The business judgment rule protects directors and officers from liability
when they make good faith business decisions in an informed and deliberate manner.”).
62. See BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:10.
63. Id. at n.22 (citing Solash v. Telex Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶93,608, 97,727, 1988
WL 3587 (Del. Ch. 1988); Schreiber v. Pennzoil Co., 419 A.2d 952, 956 (Del. Ch. 1980); David
J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int’l, 249 A.2d 427, 430, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Gries Sports Enters. v.
Cleveland Browns Football Co., 496 N.E.2d 959, 965 (Ohio 1986); In re Dollar Time Group, 223
B.R. 237, 248 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1998); Wisconsin Inv. Bd. v. Bartlett, 2000 WL 238026 (Del. Ch.
2000)).
64. Wisconsin, 2000 WL 238026, at *9 n.27 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813
(Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
65. Id. (citing Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988), overruled on other grounds
by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000)).
66. Id. § 2.10.
67. BRODSKY & ADAMSKI, supra note 59, § 2:70.
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obedience.68 These common law fiduciary responsibilities ensure that boards
act in a manner consistent with the organization’s mission and purpose.
1.

The Duty of Care

The board has a duty to make rational decisions, in good faith, with
reasonable care.69 Reasonable care means that an ordinary prudent person in
the same situation would reasonably believe that the decision made is
appropriate.70 The duty of care first requires that a director be informed;
second, a director must discharge his duties in good faith.71 The directors are
held to a standard that demands “the most scrupulous observance of [their]
duty” and “to refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the
corporation.”72 Also, directors should efficiently allocate time to making
board decisions.73
To ensure the duty of care is met, the corporation should observe corporate
formalities.74 The board should hold regular meetings.75 Before meetings, the
board should, within budget and staff resources limitations, distribute the
meeting agenda, the rules of meeting procedure, and other information needed
to make decisions.76 The board should keep good records of the meeting
minutes and committee reports and distribute them after the meetings are
held.77
2.

The Duty of Loyalty

Directors of a corporation owe a duty of loyalty to the corporation.78 This
is a fiduciary duty to act for the best interest of the nonprofit corporation and

68. David B. Rigney, Duties and Potential Liabilities of Officers and Directors of Nonprofit
Organizations, in NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT 83 (Victor Futter et al. eds.,
2002).
69. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19.
70. Id.
71. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute, DEL. ANN.
tit. 8, § 102(b) (2001), and overruled on other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695
(Del. 2009).
72. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 19.
73. See id.
74. See RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 80.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Id. at 27. Nonprofit boards are discouraged from using Robert’s Rules of Order. See
ANDY ROBINSON, GREAT BOARDS FOR SMALL GROUPS 53–56 (2006); Pamela McAllister,
Should You Use Robert’s Rules of Order?, 20 NONPROFIT WORLD 4, 6 (2001). Also, the
procedure may be best distributed in a manual for meetings.
77. See COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 27–28 (explaining that minutes
should include, at a minimum, the names of all attendees, details of voting outcomes, and any
materials relied on by the board in reaching a decision when a conflict of interest exists).
78. Id. at 19.
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stands in opposition to acting with self-interest or in the interest of another.79
It prohibits directors from engaging in fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, and
from usurping an opportunity that belongs to the corporation.80
If there is a possibility of a conflict of interest, the director must disclose
all relevant facts about the potential conflict, including the director’s personal
interest in the transaction.81 A conflict occurs when a director or an officer is
in a position where there is a duty to act in the best interest of the corporation
and a duty or the ability to act in the interest of another, possibly his or her
own.82 The director with the possible conflict has a duty not to vote—thus
only disinterested directors may vote.83 In order for a transaction to occur in
favor of the individual director over the organization, the individual director
must demonstrate, and the rest of the board must agree, that the transaction is
fair in terms of price and process.84 Otherwise the interested director must
abstain from the transaction.85
To ensure that directors comply with the duty of loyalty, the corporation
should adopt policies concerning potential conflicts of interest. Directors
should be required to disclose business relationships and transactions with
other individuals and organizations that might pose a conflict. Corporations
should also require that directors adhere to policies regarding gifts and other
activities that might lead to the appearance of impropriety.
3.

The Duty of Obedience86

Third, the nonprofit board members have a duty of obedience. This is a
duty to advance the mission and goals of the nonprofit corporation.87 It differs

79. Id. at 29.
80. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); U.S. West v. Time
Warner Inc., No. 14555, 1996 WL 307445, at *21 (Del. Ch. June 6, 1996).
81. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 30–31, 33; RUNQUIST, supra note 53,
at 73.
82. COMM. ON NONPROFIT CORPS., supra note 47, at 30.
83. Id. at 33.
84. Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets
Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396–97 (2003).
85. Reza Dibadj, Networks of Fairness Review in Corporate Law, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1,
5 (2008) (quoting Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Judicial Theoretical Fiduciary Decision Making—Some
Theoretical Perspectives, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 61 (1985)); see also Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency
of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CAL. L. REV. 393, 396–97
(2003); see Corporate Director’s Guidebook, Third Edition, 56 BUS. LAW. 1571, 1584 (2001)
(noting the interested director must gain board approval before undertaking the transaction).
86. The phrase “duty of obedience” has also been used to discuss the duty of the
organization to comply with use restrictions that donors place on gifts to the organization.
Jeremy Benjamin, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1677, 1680 (2009). “Duty of obedience,” however, is inapplicable here.
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from the duty of care in that the duty of care addresses the level of competency
with which directors must act.88 It also differs from the duty of loyalty in that
the duty of loyalty requires directors to put the interests of the organization
ahead of their personal interests.89 Litigation regarding the duty of obedience
occurs as much as litigation on the duty of care and duty of loyalty.90 The
overriding duty in the nonprofit context is that “[t]he purpose of every act and
decision of a director should be to advance the nonprofit’s purpose.”91
Charities provide benefits to the public. These organizations achieve this
goal by creating a mission to guide their efforts.92 Directors must adhere to the
mission in the way it was written and designed.93 To ensure that the duty of
obedience is met by directors, corporations should conduct mission-based
governance training for board members and should adopt mission-based
policies. Staff and directors must be able to affirm that their actions are
performed in an effort to further the corporation’s mission.
B.

Given Similar Legal Duties and Responsibilities, Are Nonprofit and ForProfit Boards Different?

Both for-profit and nonprofit boards are charged with managing and
monitoring their organizations.94 Management of a complex organization
creates challenges for even the most dedicated board member. The manner in
which these responsibilities are communicated to and understood by board
members and supported by the organization has an impact on board activities,
engagement, and efficiency. A comparison of these two types of boards in
terms of experience, compensation, and resources, is a study in contrast.
1.

For-Profit Board Members Receive Services

For-profit board members are a somewhat incestuous group. Many
directors serve on several prominent boards and refer themselves and their
friends to sit on other boards with vacancies.95 The benefits from this process
are numerous. For example, for-profit board members have an opportunity to
learn from past experiences, have access to mentoring, and practice being a
good board member through experience.96 These board members can also
form peer groups for discussion and educational purposes. In some instances,
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Rigney, supra note 68, at 87.
Id. at 84–85.
Id. at 86.
DANIEL L. KURTZ, BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE FOR NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 84 (1988).
RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 18.
KURTZ, supra note 90, at 85.
Id.
See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
See infra note 115–19 and accompanying text.
See infra note 115–19 and accompanying text.
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prior board service is a proxy for formal board training. Such nonprofit board
experience, however, is not necessary, because for-profits can pay for board
member training courses for new, inexperienced board members.97
On average, publicly-traded companies compensate their full board of
directors just over $1 million per year.98 Compensation plans for board
members vary by company and nature of service.99 Compensation can include
stipends, attendance fees, stock options, and equity awards.100 Additional
compensation may be available for certain committee services and positions
held on certain committees.101 In some instances, the compensation level can
signal a member about the quality and quantity of time that should be devoted
to board activities. In 2004, an average compensation for the for-profit board
chairperson that meets quarterly and serves as an audit committee member was

97. Directors’ Consortium is a board member training course offered by the University of
Chicago Booth School of Business, Stanford Graduate School of Business, Stanford Law School,
and the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth. Stanford Graduate School of Business, Director’s
Consortium (2008), http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/exed/directors/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). This
program teaches board members the importance of knowing their duties, in light of regulatory
changes. Id. The program reaches both new and experienced directors, showing them how to
make informed, complex decisions, and the comprehensive actions that must be taken in reaching
these decisions. Id. Stanford offers a three-day course for $7500 or a four-day combination
course for $8700. Id.. Harvard Business School offers a course in Making Corporate Boards
More Effective. Harvard Business School, Making Corporate Boards More Effective (2008),
http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/mcb/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). This program offers
directors of public companies the opportunity to learn strategies and techniques on how to
strengthen board effectiveness by learning how to maximize the knowledge and time of each of
its own board members. See id. In 2009, the program was anticipated to cost $7750, and in 2010,
another $8000. Id. Previous companies such as Adobe Systems, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company, and Motorola have participated in this program. Id. at http://www.exed.hbs.edu/
programs/mcb/print.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
98. Matthew Scott, Surprise: Boards Are Not Overpaid, FIN. WEEK, at 1, Mar. 24, 2008,
available at http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080324/REG/1497030
72/1004/TOC; see also GREG RUEL & PAUL HODGSON, THE CORPORATE LIBRARY’S ANNUAL
DIRECTOR PAY SURVEY, DIRECTOR PAY 10 (Feb. 2009). The results are based on proxy filings
made before August 1, 2008.
99. See Scott, supra note 98.
100. See id.; RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 3, 10.
101. Jill Jusko, Board of Directors’ Compensation Not ‘Unreasonable,’ Study Finds,
INDUSTRY WEEK, March 24, 2008, http://www.industryweek.com/ReadArticle.aspx?ArticleID=
16015; see ANNALISA BARRETT, THE CORPORATE BOARD, DIRECTOR PAY 2006–2007 VOLUME
II: COMPENSATION PAID TO THE FULL BOARD (2008). Northrop Grumman’s eleven board
members received a $200,000 retainer, plus additional fees for sitting on the company’s audit and
compensation committees. Matthew Scott, supra note 98. Current director compensation policy
at Gilead Sciences Inc. includes a $40,000 retainer for a director with no committee service.
Service as a committee member warrants an additional $20,000 in cash fees, as does service as
committee chair. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 12, 13, 29.
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$55,000 per year, excluding stock options and reimbursement for expenses.102
A recent study of 3,096 publicly-traded corporations’ proxy statements
indicated that “about one quarter of the companies studied paid less than
$500,000 in total compensation to its full board.”103 The top-ten most highly
compensated boards for 2007 range from a high of almost $16.5 million at
Valero Energy Corporation to just over $8 million for the board of News
Corporation.104 In 2007, the study showed that Valero Energy spent more than
$16 million on its board, with $15 million going to a single director, William
E. Greehey,105 and “that six companies offered their full board a cash bonus
based on company performance.”106 The study also noted that the practice of
establishing stock ownership guidelines for directors is growing, and that such
awards are generally correlated with a company’s size and expensed
earnings.107 The amount of total board compensation varied based on
company size.108 While these payments to for-profit boards may not be
unreasonable,109 these payments are certainly out of line with the compensation
available to directors of nonprofits.110
For-profit boards are often aware of accountability pressures exerted from
shareholders. In addition to compensation and the pressure of accountability,
for-profit boards are routinely provided with legal counsel.111 Directors
affiliated with the corporation normally rely on corporate counsel, while
unaffiliated directors are provided with independent counsel.112 In each
instance, board members are not only encouraged to have counsel review

102. Culpepper, Board of Director Compensation Shifts: More Cash, Less Options, May 11,
2004, http://www.culpepper.com/eBulletin/2004/MayCompensationArticle.asp.
103. Jusko, supra note 101; see BARRETT, supra note 101.
104. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 10.
105. Id. at 13; Joseph McCafferty, Boards Hit the $1 Million Dollar Mark, Mar. 19, 2008,
DIRECTORSHIP.COM, http://www.directorship.com/boards-earn-an-avereate-of-mor (discussing
Greehey’s 2006–07 pay).
106. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. McCafferty, supra note 105; see RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 10.
110. Jusko, supra note 101; see BARRETT, supra note 101. Northrop Grumman’s eleven
board members received a $200,000 retainer, plus additional fees for sitting on the company’s
audit and compensation committees. Scott, supra note 98.
111. See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are
Fiduciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1612 (2005) (describing how corporate counsel
regularly inform directors of their fiduciary duties).
112. See Jeffrey J. Haas & Steven R. Howard, The Heartland Funds’ Receivership and Its
Implications for Independent Mutual Funds Directors, 51 EMORY L.J. 153, 193 (2002)
(discussing changes made to the SEC’s regulation of independent mutual fund directors).
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board materials, but also to seek the advice of counsel when making
decisions.113
Not only are for-profit boards compensated at a level that encourages focus
and attention to detail, they are also provided with counsel to explain matters
taken up by the board and, as protection against personal liability, the directors
have Director and Officer Insurance.114 The pillars of compensation, legal
counsel, and insurance associated with for-profit board service enhance
efficiency, productivity, and limit personal liability.
2.

Nonprofit Board Members Are There to Serve

It is not unusual for the incestuous director relationship, common in the
for-profit sector, to be replicated on nonprofit boards: “The potential for the
intersection among for-profit boards and nonprofit boards exists.”115 For

113. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom: The
Emergence of the Independent Directors’ Counsel, 59 BUS. LAW. 1389 (2004) (discussing the
development and role of independent counsel for independent directors in the boardroom).
114. Directors and Officer Insurance (“D&O”) is often confused with Error and Omission
insurance. D&O Insurance is concerned with the performance and duties of management.
Matthew S. Chambers, Last Ditch Options: An Assessment of Independent Director Liability and
a Proposal for Congressional Action in Light of the Employee Stock Option Backdating Scandal,
42 GA. L. REV. 569, 587 (2008). It can include coverage for employment practices, including
harassment and discrimination suits, as well as fiduciary liability. Geoffrey Christopher Rapp,
New Direction for Shareholder Environmental Activism: The Aftermath of Caremark, 31 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 171 (2006) (“Director and Officer insurance policies make
it unlikely that a director will be forced to pay for fiduciary breaches.”).
115. Two additional examples of this cross-pollination are Faye Wattleton and Brad Boston.
Faye Wattleton is co-founder and president for the Center for the Advancement of Women
(CFAW), an independent, women focused, national opinion research, education, and advocacy
corporation. See Center for the Advancement of Women, http://www.advancewomen.org/
discover/media_center/presidents_bio/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). As noted on the CFWA
website:
From 1978 to 1992, as president of the Planned Parenthood Federation of America
(PPFA), Ms. Wattleton played a leading role in defining the national debate over
reproductive rights and health, and in shaping family planning policies and programs
around the world. Ms. Wattleton presently serves on the boards of directors of Columbia
University, New York Blood Center, Jazz at Lincoln Center, Pardee RAND Graduate
School and the United Nations Association of the United States of America. Ms.
Wattleton formerly served on the board of directors of Estée Lauder Companies as
chairperson of the audit & nominating and board affairs committees, as well as, formerly
serving on the board of directors of Well-Choice, Inc, Savient Pharmaceuticals and the
Quidel Corporation.
Id.
Brad Boston has served as a member of Active Power, Inc. Board of Directors since March,
2005. Active Power Elects Cisco Senior VP and CIO Boston to its Board, GREENJOBS.COM, Mar.
18, 2005, http://www.greenjobs.com/Public/newsitems/news_00059.aspx. Since Aug. 2001, Mr.
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example, the Whitney Museum of American Art has twenty-seven members on
its board of trustees.116 Twenty of these members serve on one or more
boards.117 Robert J. Hurst, a Whitney trustee, is a partner of Crestview
Partners, L.P., a private equity firm specialized in contrarian investments.118
Hurst serves on eleven additional boards, including five for-profit boards: VF
Corp., AirClic, Inc., Goldman, Sachs & Co., the Edgewater Funds, and Paris
Re Holdings, Ltd., and six nonprofit organizations: NYC 2012, Inc., a
nonprofit which promoted New York City to host the 2012 Olympics, The
Jewish Museum, 9/11 United Services Group, the National Gallery of Art, the
Aspen Institute, and the Central Park Conservancy.119 When nonprofits are
fortunate enough to attract directors with for-profit experience, there is a
noteworthy benefit. Because of his exposure to corporate practices and
policies, Mr. Hurst will bring his experiences and knowledge base into each
board meeting—whether it be for-profit or nonprofit—as will many other
board members who hold board positions in the nonprofit and for-profit sectors
simultaneously.
Directors may have different motivations for serving on nonprofit boards,
which changes both how they view their role and the expectations that the

Boston has been with Cisco Systems, Inc., and is currently serving as Cisco’s Senior Vice
President and Chief Information Officer. NetNumber, Brad Boston, Director of the Company,
http://www.netnumber.com/about-us-brad-boston.htm (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). From June
2000 to July 2001, Mr. Boston served as the Executive Vice President of Operations at Corio, an
enterprise-focused Internet application service provider. Freebase, Brad Boston, http://www.free
base.com/view/en/brad_boston (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). From June 1996 to June 2000, Mr.
Boston served as Executive Vice President of product development and delivery at the Sabre
Group, a publicly traded travel-related products company. Id. He has also held executive
positions at American Express, Visa, United Airlines/Covia, and at American National Bank and
Trust Company of Chicago. Cisco, Brad Boston, Senior Vice President, Global Government
Solution and Corporate Security Programs, http://resources.cisco.com/servletwl3/FileDown
loader/vamprod/379250/_Brad_Boston_bio.11.7.06.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). Mr. Boston
serves on the board of directors of Mercury Interactive Corporation, a publicly traded software
solutions company. Brad Boston, http://www.evanta.com/details_popup.php?cmd=speaker&id
=15. He also serves on the board of the American Red Cross USA. Brad Boston,
http://www.freebase.com/view/en/brad_boston (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). Mr. Boston holds a
B.S. in Computer Science from University of Illinois, College of Engineering, ChampaignUrbana, Illinois.
116. Whitney Museum of American Art: Board of Directors Profile, BUS. WK.,
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/board.asp?privcapId=43
76711 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
117. See id.
118. Robert Hurst: Crestview Partners L.P. Executive Profile & Biography, BUS. WK.,
http://investing.businessweek.com/businessweek/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personId=51
0450&privcapId=20394693&previousCapId=4274402&previousTitle=National%20Gallery%20
Of%20Art (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
119. Whitney Museum of American Art, supra note 116.
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organization has of them.120 This trend perpetuates “[t]he common folklore . . .
that nonprofit board members should bring to [the] organization the three W’s
[sic]: wealth (donations and fundraising), wisdom (monitoring and oversight),
and work (operational duties).”121 Nonprofit board members are often selected
for their wealth or their work.122 The last of the three Ws, wisdom,
unfortunately appears to be the least sought-after attribute in the board member
recruitment process. These directors might have no prior governance or
business experience.123 They are often community leaders with a passion for
the organization’s mission.124 Nonprofit boards, generally larger than forprofit boards, are challenged to recruit effective members in light of the long
list of responsibilities, possible liability, time commitment, and the lack of
resources available for training and support.125 The list of responsibilities of
the nonprofit board is long and includes leading of strategic planning,
determining the organization’s mission and purpose, designing and conducting
program evaluations, grant writing, conducting executive staff and ED/CEO
evaluations, interviewing important hires, attending community meetings,
fundraising, drafting conflict of interest policies, conducting board training,
speaking to the media, attending community, city, and statewide meetings to
represent the organization, reviewing financial records, taking minutes of all
meetings, opening mail, responding to inquiries of the board, providing
guidance in all ethical and financial matters, drafting employee policies, and
setting compensation.126
There is often no compensation available for nonprofit directors and little
available for reimbursement of commuting expenses or meals:127 “Only about
2% of nonprofit board members receive an annual fee and about 4% receive a

120. See Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the Structure and Composition of the
Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 207–08 (2005).
121. Id. at 207.
122. Nonprofits are interested in acquiring unrestricted funding. See id. at 208 (noting that
board directors on nonprofit boards favor a board full of individuals who are willing and able to
donate money without restrictions). Traditional funders, foundations, governments, and, to some
extent, corporations often earmark funds for direct program services. This leaves little funding
available to supplement programs or for capacity building.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 120, at 206 (stating that nonprofit boards are generally
larger).
126. Id. at 207 (“But the particulars of what the directors should be doing are more
complicated for the nonprofit.”).
127. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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per-meeting fee,” unusual outside of large and complex nonprofit
organizations.128
Charles Prince, CEO of Citigroup and a member of Juilliard School’s
board, said that “nonprofits carry ‘even more of a burden of
responsibility’ . . . . ‘They don’t have the check and balance of shareholder
activists showing up at annual meetings to point out problems.’”129 A recent
study by Professor Judith L. Miller found that nonprofit board members
struggled to identify any persons or groups to whom they were accountable.130
This lack of accountability, including lack of accountability to shareholders,
forces nonprofit boards to explain their conduct to a broad range of parties with
competing agendas, such as donors, governmental authorities, clients, and staff
members.131 These competing interests often push nonprofit board members to
pursue differing goals in their board responsibilities.132 When nonprofits
accommodate these interests, it can be difficult for them to articulate and strive
toward a coherent mission.133
The adversities faced by nonprofit board members undermine power and
independence in the boardroom. Professor Judith Miller has “found that
nonprofit board members rubberstamp management’s proposals without
[evaluating] the effect those proposals would have on the organization.”134
She further noted that “boards frequently defer[red] to staff and the chief
executive officer,” even when circumstances appeared to mandate a more
diligent oversight regime.135 In a recent study, Professor Edward Glaeser
confirmed Miller’s findings that nonprofit organizations are often captured by
their staff and tend to evolve towards “worker cooperatives,” especially as the
net worth of the organization increases.136 Other empirical studies also
corrborate that “[l]arge or small . . . most voluntary agencies are unusually

128. Maureen Glabman, The Future of Voluntary Governance, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS,
Sept. 2006, at 68.
129. Carol Hymowitz, In Sarbanes-Oxley Era, Running a Nonprofit Is Only Getting Harder,
WALL ST. J., June 21, 2005, at B1.
130. Lumen N. Mulligan, What’s Good for the Goose Is Not Good for the Gander: SarbanesOxley-Style Nonprofit Reforms, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1981, 1986 (2007) (citing Judith L. Miller,
The Board as a Monitor of Organizational Activity: The Applicability of Agency Theory to
Nonprofit Boards, 12 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 429, 439–42 (2002) [hereinafter Board
as Monitor]).
131. Miller, Board as a Monitor, supra note 130, at 442.
132. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1986.
133. Id. at 1986 (citing O’Regan & Oster, supra note 121, at 205–06).
134. Miller, Board as a Monitor, supra note 130, at 438.
135. Id.
136. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction, in THE GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS 1, 36 (Edward L. Glaeser ed., 2003).
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dependent on the quality of their executive leadership and, therefore, more
subject to idiosyncratic rather than structural factors.”137
In spite of similar duties and legal obligations, nonprofit and for-profit
boards operate differently. Nonprofit board members are often unable to pay
sufficient attention to the materials and lack the knowledge to manage,
monitor, or exercise independence.138 As imagined, the majority of nonprofit
boards are disadvantaged in terms of resources, finances, and talent.139 The
significant differences between the resources available to nonprofit boards and
for-profit boards should not be glossed over. The deficits in terms of
resources, training, experience, and support in the nonprofit arena can leave a
nonprofit management environment vulnerable and unable to detect or remedy
programmatic and fiscal problems. Nonprofits with weak governance are most
susceptible to fraud and other types of mismanagement. These disadvantages
for nonprofit boards will not be addressed by further regulation involving
additional disclosures.
C. Nonprofit Regulation in a Pre-Sarbanes-Oxley World
The lack of regulation is not the biggest problem facing nonprofits.
Nonprofits are regulated by state laws, the IRS, and informally by donors
through their ability to walk away and leave the nonprofit without sufficient
funding. Donors can obtain information about nonprofits from IRS Form
990.140 Most 501(c)(3) charities file IRS Form 990 annually with the IRS.141
Information from Form 990 can be used by donors to assist in deciding where
to contribute their funds and time.142 In the past, nonprofits did not have to
provide the public with Form 990 unless the request was made in person at the
nonprofit’s office.143 But currently, “regulations require that a 501(c)
organization make copies of its three most recent Forms 990 for anyone who
requests them, whether in person or by mail, fax, or e-mail.”144 Since July
1998, the IRS has scanned and posted Forms 990 on the Internet as it receives

137. Ralph M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR 240, 244 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
138. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 120, at 208 (noting the difficulty with “meddling”
board members among nonprofits).
139. See supra notes 120–26.
140. I.R.S., THE NEW FORM 990: WHAT TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS NEED TO KNOW,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p4741.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
141. Quality 990, About Form 990, http://www.qual990.org/value_of_990.html (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010).
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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them.145 In 1999, the California Attorney General created a website where
users can search for information concerning nonprofit organizations.146
Though it does not provide access to informational forms filed by charities,
such as Forms 990, it does link to the Guidestar website where those items can
be searched.147 The approximately 350,000 religious congregations are
considered public charities, but are not required to register with the IRS.148
Religious organizations are exempt from filing Form 990.149 They remain
exempt, even though they have significant financial assets. In 2006 alone,
religious institutions received $96.82 billion in donations150 and $2.2 billion in
federal grants to provide social services.151 But religious organizations are not
inherently less likely to engage in poor decision-making or wrongdoing.
Bearing this in mind, along with considerable assets so many nonprofits
maintain, all nonprofits with revenues in excess of $25,000 should now be
required to file Form 990 with the IRS.
Individual states have always had the first line of responsibility for
regulating nonprofit organizations. And, to this day, state regulations vary
considerably.152 But generally, state laws tend to uniformly cover a nonprofit’s
ability to conduct ethical business through contract, consumer protection, and
fundraising laws.153 States regulate nonprofits most often through the State

145. Id.
146. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Charities: Filings and Searches, http://ag.ca.gov/charities/
index.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); GuideStar, Nonprofit Reports and Forms 990 for Donors,
Granmakers, and Businesses, http://www2.guidestar.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
147. Cal. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 146; GuideStar, supra note 146.
148. WING ET AL., supra note 19, at 139.
149. I.R.S., Filing Requirements—Exempt Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/
0,,id=96103,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
150. Jeffrey Thomas, Charitable Donations by Americans Reach Record High, USINFO,
June 26, 2007, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/June/200706261522251CJsamo
hT0.8012354.html.
151. The White House, Fact Sheet: The Faith-Based and Community Initiative: A Quiet
Revolution in the Way Government Addresses Human Need (2008), http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080129-8.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
152. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: FEDERAL
AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 53–54, 306 (2004); NORMAN I. SILBER, A CORPORATE
FORM OF FREEDOM: THE EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN NONPROFIT SECTOR 20–23 (2001). See
also Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 613, 618 (2005)
(noting that nonprofit law at the federal level traditionally focused on “issues directly connected
with taxation” while state law focused on issues of “fiduciary duties and governance principles”).
Over time there has been an “extension of federal supervision into areas . . . for which the states
have been principally responsible.” Id.
153. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 152, at 476–95; Seth Perlman, Advising Nonprofit
Organizations 2009, State and Federal Regulation of Charitable Solicitations, 182 PLI/NY 355
(2004).
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Attorney General’s Office.154 Most have strong public policy interests in
safeguarding the funds of nonprofits because states often support nonprofits
through licensing and funding in the form of grants and forgone tax revenue on
charitable contributions to nonprofits.
Between the 1940s and the 1960s, several states passed legislation
requiring registration and reporting of charities in an effort to enhance the
power of the state attorneys general.155 But it has long been demonstrated that
state attorney general offices have neither the person-power, nor the will, to
monitor nonprofits effectively.156 For example, in 2002, the New York State
Attorney General’s Charities Bureau had six accountants to oversee 40,000
charities and was primarily responsible for helping charities comply with state
requirements rather than aggressively policing them.157 At that time, the
Bureau relied on information kept on three-by-five-inch index cards to track
the organizations—requests for the money to computerize the operation had
been repeatedly rejected.158 In the words of Professor Harvey Dale, a longtime observer of the nonprofit world:
[G]overnment regulators (and most particularly attorneys general, to whom the
law confides the principal role in policing charities) tend to allocate their
scarce regulatory resources to other more politically potent portions of their
domains. In most states, the Charity Bureau of the Attorney General is
159
inactive, ineffective, overwhelmed, or some combination of these.

The oversight by state attorneys general has been generally ineffective. But
the attorneys general in sixteen “key” states160 supervise charities in a way that
manages to positively impact their compliance with the laws.161 These sixteen
states are key states because they contain 57% of all public charities.162 In

154. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 152, at 301.
155. Some states do earmark charity registration fees for oversight and enforcement functions.
See, e.g., 44 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/19 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 128.670(9) (2007).
156. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 221–28 (1965)
(discussing tax inadequacies and the legislative attempts to solve them); Peter Swords, Nonprofit
Accountability: The Sector’s Response to Government Regulation, 25 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
413 (1999).
157. Nina Bernstein, Officials Overlooked Dire Signs at Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at
B1.
158. Id.
159. Swords, supra note 156, at 413.
160. California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and
Texas. DAVID BIESMESDERFER & ANDRAS KOSARAS, THE VALUE OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
STATE CHARITY REGULATORS & PHILANTHROPISTS 4 (2006), available at http://www.giving
forum.org.policy/regulators.html or http:/www.cof.org.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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most of these sixteen key states, there is no funding earmarked for charitable
oversight and enforcement, and in spite of this, the states still perform well in
the area of regulation.163
There have been several instances of vigorous and successful prosecutions
of nonprofits by states’ attorneys general as well as various U.S. Attorney
Generals. New York’s Attorney General investigated the misuse of the funds
by Hale House, a nonprofit founded to care for homeless infants and
toddlers.164 The investigation resulted in the installation of an interim board of
directors.165 Furthermore, in agreement with prosecutors, former President Dr.
Lorraine Hale pleaded guilty to a single larceny charge, and her husband, Jesse
DeVore, pleaded guilty to a fraud charge. The husband and wife each received
five years probation and are paying restitution.166
In 2002, the U.S. Attorney General prosecuted the former chief executive
of the United Way of the National Capital Area after the media revealed that
the organization misappropriated $1.6 million. An audit revealed personal
purchases on the corporate credit card and other financial mismanagements.167
As a result, the chief executive was sentenced to twenty-seven months in jail
and faced civil lawsuits.168 In 2002, the Easter Seals Iowa chapter fired its
former president, who subsequently pleaded guilty to two theft charges,
resulting in a loss of $230,000 to the organization.169 The misappropriation
was revealed in an audit, and the former president received three-years
probation.170
Additionally, in 2005, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Eastern District of
California indicted forty-nine people, alleging a scheme to misappropriate
money intended for Hurricane Katrina relief victims.171 The U.S. Attorney
sought restitution.172

163. There is information available about states which earmark charity registration fees for
oversight and enforcement functions. Id. at 4.
164. Scandal at Hale House, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2001, at WK16.
165. Joseph P. Fried, For Hale House Couple, A Struggle After the Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2003, at N37.
166. Id.
167. United Way of the National Capital Area Rebuilds Reputation, PHILANTHROPY NEWS
DIG., Sept. 30, 2003, http://foundationcenter.org/pnd/news/story.jhtml?id=44600002 (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010).
168. Brad Wolverton, D.C. United Way Leader Sentenced to Jail Time, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, May 17, 2004, http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2004/05/2004051701.htm.
169. Elizabeth Stanton, National Briefing, Midwest: Iowa: Charity Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
9, 2002, at A20.
170. Former Easter Seals Executive in Iowa Gets Probation for Stealing from Charity,
ASSOC. PRESS, June 20, 2002, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-53751495.html.
171. Dozens Indicted in Alleged Katrina Scam, Dec. 29, 2005, CNN.COM,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/12/28/katrina.fraud/index.html.
172. Id.
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As the foregoing demonstrates, prosecutions of nonprofits for financial
mistakes do occur and are a real concern for nonprofits and their boards. Once
a state regulator decides to prosecute a nonprofit, it typically seeks remedies
such as restitution, imposition of fines, removal of directors and executives,
and, in some instances, dissolution of the charity.173
Though state attorneys general historically have been responsible for
charities’ accountability, because of a lack of resources, the IRS has also
become the primary regulator of nonprofit behavior.174 The IRS regulates
nonprofits through its ability to grant or withhold nonprofit status to
organizations. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code requires that
nonprofits seeking charitable status meet certain requirements and refrain from
certain activity.175
II. THE RISE OF SARBANES-OXLEY
In 2002, the federal government adopted Sarbanes-Oxley in response to
public concern over highly publicized, fraudulent activity by public
corporations.176 Such notable debacles include Enron, Tyco, Adelphia,
WorldCom, and HealthSouth.177 As a response, Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to
facilitate sound governance and fiscal transparency through accurate disclosure
and processes in publicly-traded corporations.178 It requires corporations to
disclose whether or not—and if not, the reason therefore—an issuer has
adopted a code of ethics for senior financial officers, its principal financial
officer, comptroller or principal accounting officer, or any persons performing
similar functions.179 Such a code of ethics should articulate standards to
protect the corporation from conflicts of interest.180 It also requires the
corporation to create an internal structure to ensure material accuracy of

173. BIESMESDERFER & KOSARAS, supra note 160, at 2.
174. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., S. REP. NO. GAO-02-526, at 26 (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02526.pdf.
175. Prohibited activity includes the use of earnings to benefit a private individual. 26 I.R.C.
§ 501(c)(3) (2006).
176. Paula J. Dalley, Public Company Corporate Governance Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 185, 185 (2003).
177. Penelope Patsurius, The Corporate Scandal Sheet, FORBES (2002), http://www.forbes.
com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html.
178. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006) In addition to Sarbanes Oxley,
publicly traded corporations are regulated and examined by a number of bodies including the
Internal Revenue Service, the Exchanges, the threat of Shareholder suits, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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financial reports, provide protections for whistle-blowers, and establish rules of
conduct for lawyers.181
There is little doubt that Sarbanes-Oxley is the most important piece of
legislation in the area of corporations since the adoption of the federal
securities laws in the 1930s.182 Sarbanes-Oxley has become synonymous with
the phrases “good corporate governance” and “best practices.”183 The
mandates of Sarbanes-Oxley have been enhanced through rules implemented
by stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange and the
Nasdaq.184 The explicit and the implicit reforms attributable to SarbanesOxley will collectively be referred to as “Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms” herein.
Corporations, attorneys, and accountants have made great strides in their
individual arenas to meet the varied demands of Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms.185
But critics have come from every corner and hit upon all facets of Sarbanes-

181. E. William Bates, II & Elizabeth M. Schubert, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Less Applicable to
Not-for-Profits, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 29, 2003.
182. See Steven R. Harmon et. al., Morgan, Miller, Blair, Historic Redesign of Securities Law
Should Be of Interest to All, Aug. 30, 2002, http://www.mmblaw.com/newsevents.php?News
ID=34; The Compliance Partners, Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://www.thecompliancepartners.com/
klmbill.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Allison Fass, One Year Later, The Impact of SarbanesOxley, FORBES.COM, July 22, 2003, http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/22/cz_af_0722
sarbanes.html.
183. Paul S. Atkins, Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission, The SarbanesOxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content, and Status of Implementation, Video Address at the
International Financial Law Review European Awards, (Mar. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch032503psa.htm; Robert Rinninsland, Understanding the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, BNA TAX & ACCOUNTING, Feb. 13, 2002, http://www.fdtacite.org/articles/ox.htm; Larry Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing
Corporate Monitoring After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 351–54, 363 (2004);
Susi H. Willis, Best Practices: the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Good Governance for All Entities, IND.
BUS. MAG., Nov. 2005, at 63.
184. One such enhancement is the New York Stock Exchanges’ imposition of the definition
and requirement to have independent directors on the board or directors. See Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745 (Nov. 4, 2003).
185. Thomas Hoffman, IT Managers Brace to Meet Ongoing Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance
Demands, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 2, 2004, http://www.computerworld.com/governmenttopics/
government/policy/story/0,10801,94956,00.html; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Complying with the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/industry.nsf/docid/743696FEA3F3D3D385257
0140078BB42 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Upside Software Inc., Contract Management Helps
Meet Sarbanes-Oxley Act Requirements (Oct. 2004), http://www.upsidesoft.com/Upside+Soft
ware/PDF/BP%20SOX%20FINAL%20101804.pdf; Pat Broderick, Attorneys Help Firms Avoid
Corporate Fraud: Landscape After Enron Offers Plenty of Opportunity, SAN DIEGO BUS. J., May
29, 2006, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5247/is_22_27/ai_n29272838?tag=
content;col1; IBM Corp., Accelerating Your Response to Sarbanes-Oxley Legislation (2004),
ftp://ftp.software.ibm.com/software/lotus/lotusweb/workplace/businessControlReporting/ISSLSO
X.pdf.
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Oxley Reforms.186 Various lawyers, firms, and representative associations
complained that Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms may adversely impact the attorney–
client relationship; accountants complained, among other things, that the
attempts toward auditor independence would not be successful, and
prohibitions against consulting and auditing services were unnecessary; small
businesses and representative groups complained that the cost of compliance
would be enormous; CEOs complained about the complexity and distraction
caused by the Act; and others complained that the requirements of the Act will
threaten competitiveness.187 Critics feared small company delistings, fewer
Initial Public Offerings (“IPOs”), and reduced profit margins due to the
compliance costs associated with Sarbanes-Oxley.188
In the six years that have passed since enactment, the fears and doubts
about Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms’ impact on capital formation have subsided.
With respect to IPOs, in 2007, there were 296 IPOs raising $65.1 billion; in
2006, there were 236 IPOs raising $50 billion; in 2005, there were 221 IPOs
raising $39 billion; in 2004, there were 260 IPOs raising $51.9 billion; and
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley, in 2003, there were 88 IPOs raising $18.6 billion.189
A high percentage of venture or financial-sponsor-backed IPOs helped to
increase IPO activity. Complaints that compliance is a distraction have been
abandoned as the view that corporate responsibility should be and ongoing
focus of management has gained favor.

186. See Laura Rich, Sarbanes-Oxley Draws Renewed Criticism, INC.: THE DAILY RESOURCE
ENTREPRENEURS, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.inc.com/news/articles/200501/sarbox.html;
Joseph T. Lonsdale, Sarbanes-Oxley Act Draws Criticism, (Sept. 2002), http://securities.stanford.
edu/news-archive/2002/20020920_Headline08_Lonsdale.htm; Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley
Five Years Later: Will Criticism of SOX Undermine Its Benefits?, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 595, 595–
96 (2008). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Comments on Proposed Rule: Revision of
the Commission’s Auditor Independence Requirements, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/
s71300.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
187. See U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 186.
188. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., S. REP. NO. GAO-06-361, at 7 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06361.pdf; Paul Arnold, Give Them a Choice: Solving SarbanesOxley Section 404 Inefficiency with Optional Compliance, available at http://works.bepress.com/
paul_arnold/2/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
189. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007 US IPO WATCH: ANALYSIS AND TRENDS 6 (2008),
available at http://www.altassets.com/pdfs/pwc_2007_us_ipo__watch.pdf; PRICEWATERHOUSE
COOPERS, US IPO WATCH: 2006 ANALYSIS AND TREND 1–2 (2007), available at
http://www.pwc.com/extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/docid/23CFAAFB69354CBD852572BA007A2
1AA/$File/2006analysis_usipowatch.pdf; US Recorded Largest Number of IPOs in 2004 Since
Internet Bubble, ALTASSETS, Mar. 01, 2005, http://www.altassets.com/news/arc/2005/nz
6392.php.
FOR
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Sarbanes-Oxley covers a broad range of reform.190 While Sarbanes-Oxley
is applicable to only a small fraction of business enterprises, it has had a ripple
effect throughout the economy.191 Small businesses, nonreporting entities,
large nonprofits, and organizations doing business with reporting companies
The
have proactively adopted many Sarbanes-Oxley-like measures.192
voluntary adoption of these measures has been referred to as “creep.”193 Creep
is the voluntary adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley practices as well as the gratuitous
introduction and application of Sarbanes-Oxley practices.194
The reforms mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley in the areas of Auditor
Independence, Corporate Responsibility, and Financial Disclosure are most
applicable to the nonprofit sector. These changes will be discussed in this
section of the Article.
A.

Auditor Independence

Sarbanes-Oxley restrains registered public accounting firms engaged in an
audit for a public-company client from providing certain nonauditing services,
including, but not limited to, bookkeeping, appraisals or valuation services,
human resources functions, broker–dealer or actuarial investments advisory
services, legal or expert services, and any other investment services.195 The
board must preapprove all auditing services and non-auditing services outside
of the enumerated list.196 The lead auditing partner must change at least every

190. The titles of Sarbanes-Oxley are: Title 1, Public Company Accounting Oversight Board;
Title II, Auditor Independence; Title III, Corporate Responsibility; Title IV, Enhanced Financial
Disclosures; Title V, Analysis Conflicts of Interest; Title VI, SEC Resources and Authority; Title
VII, Studies and Reports; Title VIII, Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability; Title IX,
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements; Title X, Corporate Tax Returns; Title XI, Corporate
Fraud Accountability. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006).
191. See PAUL D. BROUDE ET AL., NAT’L DIRECTORS INST., THE IMPACT OF SARBANESOXLEY ON PRIVATE & NONPROFIT COMPANIES, 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.directors
andboards.com/ndi.pdf.
192. See Gerald L. Blanchard, A Troubled Recipe for Nonprofits: Equal Parts Congress
Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. Treasury Department, the IRS, and Bankruptcy, THE RISK MGMT. ASS’N J.,
March 2007, at 59, 65.
193. Greg Baldwin et al., “Compliance Creep”: The Ever Expanding World of Compliance,
Financial Services Technology, http://www.usfst.com/currentissue/article.asp?art=272053&
issue=228 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
194. Id. The second usage of the term “creep” can be seen when accounting firms amend
their general auditing practices to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley and then apply these processes to
all auditing clients regardless of their reporting status. See Blanchard, supra note 192, at 59, 65.
195. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 771–72 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
196. Id.
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five years, and, in addition, the auditor is required to report to the audit
committee, which must be comprised of independent directors.197
B.

Corporate Responsibility

Many companies have their own view of corporate responsibility.198
Corporate responsibility involves a company incorporating economic,
environmental, and social impacts into their business decisions as well as
following regulations and procedural guidelines.199 The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is required to instruct the securities exchanges to
prevent the listing of corporations that do not meet certain requirements.200
Officers of periodic reporting companies are required to certify that they have
reviewed such filings and, based on their knowledge, that the report does not
contain an untrue statement of material fact or omit a material fact necessary to
make the statement not misleading.201 Further, the officer must certify that the
financial statement in the filings fairly represents the true financial condition of
the company.202 The signing officer is also required to certify his or her
responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal controls, and to have
designed, evaluated, and presented conclusions in the report about internal
controls to ensure that material information relating to the issuer and its
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to such officer by others within those
entities.203

197. Id. at 773.
198. See Walt Disney Company, Corporate Responsibility, http://corporate.disney.go.com/
corporate/corporate_responsibility.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Merck, Corporate
Responsibility, http://www.merck.com/corporate-responsibility/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Intel,
Corporate Responsibility, http://www.intel.com/intel/corpresponsibility/index.htm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010); Starbucks, Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.starbucks.com/aboutus/
csr.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
199. See Mallen Baker, Definitions of Corporate Social Responsibility, http://www.mallen
baker.net/csr/CSRfiles/definition.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Maggi Hill, Corporate Social
Responsibility—The Responsible Thing to Do, MERCER BUS., May 1, 2007, http://find
articles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3697/is_200705/ai_n19433654?tag=content;col1.
200. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 776 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15,
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
201. Id. at 777. Periodic reports, both 10-Ks and 10-Qs, are required by the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 776. Reporting companies are defined as those with more than $10
million in assets and whose securities are held by more than 500 owners. These companies need
to file annual and other periodic reports. MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 209 (9th ed. 2005).
202. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 777.
203. Id.
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Director Independence

While guidelines about Director Independence do not appear in the Act
itself, they are required by the Stock Exchanges and are considered a part of
Sarbanes-Oxley Reforms.204 Each exchange has its own rules. The rules may
vary slightly, but are consistent on most material matters. Under the NYSE’s
rules, a director is considered independent if he or she does not have a material
An affirmative finding of
relationship with the listed company.205
independence must be made by the board, and any conflicts must be deemed
immaterial.206 The independence determination must be disclosed to
Employment, affiliation, or
shareholders in a proxy statement.207
compensation over the past three years might prevent a director from being
independent for board purposes.208
2.

Committee Requirements

Stock Exchange listed company committees engaged in governance,
director selection, compensation, and auditing functions, must be comprised
exclusively of independent directors.209 These committees must also have
publicly available charters which articulate the purpose and responsibility of
each committee.210
3.

Governance guidelines

Listed companies must also develop and adopt certain governance
guidelines and make these available to the public.211 The governance
guidelines must cover a broad range of specific topics, including but not
limited to, director education, training, qualifications, responsibility,
management succession, and an annual self-evaluation report.212
4.

Code of ethics

Stock Exchange listed companies must also develop and adopt codes of
ethics for its officers, directors, and employees.213 These codes must be
available to the public and should cover conflicts of interest, use of company
204. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.00-01 (2009), http://nysemanual.
nyse.com; NASDAQ, Inc., NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5605 (2009), http://nasdaq.
cchwallstreet.com/.
205. Listed Company Manual § 303A.02(a).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. § 303A.02(b)(i).
209. Id. §§ 303A.02, 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.07.
210. Listed Company Manual, supra note 204, §§ 303A.02, 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.07.
211. Id. § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 204, at R. 5250(b)(1).
212. Listed Company Manual § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. 5601.
213. Listed Company Manual § 303A.09; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5610.
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assets, and contain language encouraging the reporting of any illegal or
unethical activity.214
C. Enhanced Financial Disclosures
Sarbanes-Oxley requires that reporting companies disclose matters having
a significant impact of the company’s financial statement; prohibits personal
loans to directors or executives; and requires reporting of insider activities by
directors, executives, and shareholders with more than 10% of any class of
shares.215 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, each reporting company must file its ethics
code for senior financial officers and a management assessment of internal
controls.216 Reporting companies must disclose whether the audit committee
has a financial expert.217 As a response to corporate scandals, it is possible that
Sarbanes-Oxley has bolstered investor confidence in the markets.218 It has
been suggested that similar regulations can be the answer to an embattled
nonprofit sector.
III. NONPROFITS SCANDALS AND REGULATORY RESPONSES
Nonprofit malfeasance did not historically generate the amount of public
outcry associated with the recent Enron scandal. Perhaps there is a direct
relationship between public outrage to management malfeasance and
individual harm. In the Enron case, individuals were injured, there were
layoffs, job losses, and millions in retirement funds lost.219 These major losses
affected not only the employees of Enron but the market as well. It also
sparked new discussion on ways to prevent this type of loss from happening
ever again.220
In contrast, nonprofit malfeasance does not result in donor harm. The
injury caused by nonprofit malfeasance is often to those individuals who rely
on nonprofits for services through the reduction in quality programming and
subsequent donations. But the impact of nonprofit malfeasance may be
detrimental to the role of a nonprofit’s ability to fundraise and carry out its

214. Listed Company Manual § 303A.10; NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, R. IM-5610.
215. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 745, 785–88 (codified in scattered sections of 11,
15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
216. Id. at 789.
217. Id. at 790.
218. Part of this confidence building is also related to Sarbanes-Oxley’s increased Corporate
and Criminal Fraud Accountability found in Title VIII and the White-Collar Crime Penalty
Enhancements found in Title IX. See id. at 746.
219. Rick Bragg, Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs and Added Sting of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
20, 2002, at A1.
220. Daniel Altman, The Pensions, Bush Promises a Look at Employee Risks, but Experts Say
Solutions Won’t Be Easy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at C4.
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mission. As problems arose due to fraud by publicly-traded companies, the
media and the public began to examine nonprofit corporations for similar
behavior. Nonprofits have operated with minimal scrutiny from the media and
regulators because the dollar amounts at stake are minimal and regulatory
resources are scarce.
Even though donors, big and small, expect no return on their donations,
and there are no shares, dividends, or proxy statements to watch for, nonprofits
are still big businesses with a large economic impact.221 Evaluating nonprofits
in terms of their size, revenue, employees, and expenditures reveals striking
similarities to their for-profit counterparts.
From 1995 to 2002, $1.28 billion was lost in nonprofit scandals.222 Among
them were Nature Conservancy, a nonprofit which buys land for nature
preserves (allegations of insider retail estate purchases from board members),
Bishop Estate of Hawaii, a one-hundred-year-old trust, charged with educating
the children of Hawaii (allegations of corruption involving state supreme court
judges and many powerful elites), and the United Way of the National Capital
Area223 (allegations of financial fraud).224
221. Numerous reports and studies have examined nonprofit sector economic impact and have
concluded that in many communities the economic impact exceeds $1 Billion. See, e.g., PUB.
SECTOR CONSULTANTS, INC., ECONONOMIC BENEFITS OF MICHIGAN’S NONPROFIT SECTOR
PARTS I & II (2004), available at http://www.publicsectorconsultants.com/Documents/mna
/index.htm; LESTER M. SALAMON & STEPHANIE LESSANS GELLER, MAINE NONPROFIT
EMPLOYMENT (2003), available at http://www.nonprofitmaine.org/documents/Employment
Study.pdf; CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND. UNIV. ET AL., INDIANA NONPROFIT EMPLOYMENT
(2005), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~nonprof/results/inemploy/indianaempl05.pdf; UNIV.
OF N.M. BUREAU OF BUS. & ECON. RESEARCH ET AL., ECONONOMIC IMPACT OF NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS IN NEW MEXICO (2006), available at http://www.nmag.org/files/nmag
images/EconomicImpactofNMNonprofits.pdf; IOWA WORKFORCE DEV., IMPACT OF
CHARITABLE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON IOWA’S ECONOMY & QUALITY OF LIFE 4, 6–17
(2007), available at http://www.iowalifechanging.com/downloads/char_giving_report_FINAL02-01-2007.pdf; DADE CNTY. FOUND., SECTOR OF IMPACT II: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
NONPROFITS IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY 2, 5–6 (2006), available at http://www.dadecommunity
foundation.org/Site/docs/2006%20Sector%20of%20Impact.pdf.
222. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Nov. 27, 2003; see also Marion R. Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers
and Directors of Charities: A Survey of Press Reports 1995–2000 (Hauser Ctr. for Nonprofit
Org., Working Paper No. 20, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=451240.
223. Peter Whoriskey & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Charity Concealed Pilfering: Auditors Had
Flagged United Way Ex-Chief, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 2003, at A7 [hereinafter
Charity Concealed Pilfering].
224. Allegheny Health is another example of financial fraud that stemmed from
misappropriation of funds by its CEO, including comingling of funds, which led to one of the
largest bankruptcies among nonprofit companies. See Lawton R. Burns et al., The Fall of the
House of AHERF: The Allegheny Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan./Feb. 2000, at 7, 10; Lisa
Goldstein, The Failure of AHERF: 5 Important Lessons, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Aug. 2008,
at 52, 52.
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Such high-profile scandals draw the attention of lawmakers and donors to
the functioning of nonprofit boards and the role of directors. In addition to
financial losses, nonprofit fraud and mismanagement can cause the erosion of
donor confidence.225 After the United Way scandal, donations dropped from
$45 million to $18 million.226
It is apparent that the market conditions, criminality, irresponsibility, and
mismanagement that led to the sweeping reforms implemented through
Sarbanes-Oxley exist in the nonprofit sector. But Sarbanes-Oxley does not
extend to nonprofit corporations.227 Enhanced media and public scrutiny raises
awareness for the necessity of the nonprofit boards to comply with corporate
formalities and to follow their legal duties.228 Similar to Sarbanes-Oxley,
regulation will make it easier for nonprofits to rebuild the trust of its donors.
But the adoption and application of Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulation must
be carefully considered in terms of its broad applicability to the nonprofit
sector. Only the largest for-profit corporations are governed by SarbanesOxley. Perhaps it is inappropriate, in terms of cost–benefit, for smaller
organizations to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley-like regulations.
A.

Nonprofit Regulation in a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World

Sarbanes-Oxley is a high-water mark for the regulation of corporations and
is the backdrop for the consideration of nonprofit regulatory reform.
Commentators suggest that states should adopt Sarbanes-Oxley-like provisions
in the area of nonprofit governance to stem the tide of scandals and bolster
contributors’ confidence in the sector. Some notable efforts toward state
regulation of the nonprofit sector have already commenced. Legislators in
California, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas have introduced measures to
increase state regulation over nonprofit organizations (“baby SOX”).
After Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley, “the New York Legislature led the
way by taking up a wide-ranging bill, championed by the state attorney general
that would mandate Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms for the nonprofit sector.”229
In January 2003, then-New York Attorney General Elliot Spitzer began a
charge to apply Sarbanes-Oxley-type accounting disclosure provisions to the

225. Whoriskey & Salmon, supra note 223, at A7.
226. Id.
227. Bates, II & Schubert, supra note 181, at 1.
228. JOHN P. VAIL & JOSHUA J. MINTZ, GOVERNANCE OF NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
IN 2003, at 1–2 (2003).
229. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1983; S.B. 4836-A, 2003 Leg., 226th Gen. Sess. (N.Y.
2003). This bill was substantially amended. S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2003).
The legislature has yet to pass this bill. See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The
Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
559, 562–64 (2005) (outlining the legislative history of the New York bill).
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state’s nonprofit organizations.230 Spitzer sought to strengthen state laws “to
After Spitzer’s interest, other states, including
protect donors.”231
Massachusetts and California, attempted to introduce Sarbanes-Oxley-like
provisions applicable to nonprofits. California was the first state to enact these
Sarbanes-Oxley-styled regulations. The California Integrity Act of 2004
enhances disclosures required of nonprofits operating in California.232
Massachusetts introduced a similar bill:
The Massachusetts attorney general . . . proposed his own bill similar to New
York’s. Neither bill passed. Numerous other states have followed suit by
introducing comparable Sarbanes-Oxley-like bills that ultimately failed to pass.
Several states, however, have passed acts codifying some Sarbanes-Oxley-like
reforms for nonprofit organizations, California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act of
233
2004 being, perhaps, the most well-known.

In 2004 the Texas State Board of Accounting recommended to the governor,
lieutenant governor, and speaker of the House that Texas not adopt additional
layers of regulations for nonprofits.234 The board believed that standards
should be developed nationally, but did not believe that SOX-like legislation
was needed for officers and directors.235 The effect of these various bills can
be summarized as follows:
The unifying theme of these Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired bills and actions is their
reliance upon disclosure mechanisms (e.g., officer-certified financial

230. Jeff Jones, N.Y.’s Attorney General Seeking to Apply Sarbanes-Oxley Act, NONPROFIT
TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1.
231. Id.
232. The Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2004).
233. Id. (citing Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote
the Financial Integrity of Public Charities, http://classic.cof.org/files/Documents/Building%20
Strong%20Ethical%20Foundations/Mass_AG.Act_to_promote_fin_integ_pub_charities.pdf, (last
visited Jan 11, 2010) [hereinafter Mass. A.G. Proposal]; S.B. 1115, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2004); H.B. 514, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2004); H.B. 724, Adjourned Sess. Of 2003-2004
Biennium (Vt. 2004); S.B. 153, 125th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 1019, 187th
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003)). The U.S. Senate, spearheaded by Senator Grassley, has also
considered Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legislation, which is beyond the scope of this Article.
See CARE Act of 2003, S.B. 476, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Panel on the Nonprofit Sector,
Strengthening Transparency Governance Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final
Report to Congress and the Nonprofit Sector (2005), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_
Final_Report.pdf (providing a sweeping series of federal reforms upon request of the Senate
Finance Committee); see, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §17510.5 (West Supp. 2006); CAL.
GOV’T. CODE §§12581-12599.7; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §21a-190b, c, f, h (West Supp. 2006);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §17-1763, 17-6002 (Supp. 2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§5004 (Supp.
2005); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §7:28III-a (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 12-4-14
(LexisNexis 2004) (applying only to recipients of state grants).
234. Karen Gantt et al., Sarbanes-Oxley, Accounting Scandals, and State Accountancy
Boards: Red Versus Blue State Reactions, CPA J., Sept. 2007, at 18, 22.
235. Id.
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statements), governance mandates (e.g., audit committees), executive
compensation review and approval, whistleblower protection, and auditing
requirements (e.g., independent audits performed by CPAs) to induce
236
corporate integrity.

In addition to attempts at increased state regulation, the post-SarbanesOxley era ushered in new proposals for nonprofit regulation from the Office of
the Inspector General for Health and Human Services, the United States
Sentencing Commission, and the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners.237 In 2003, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) entered
the realm of regulating nonprofits by promulgating rules for nonprofits
receiving federal funds.
The GAO regulations focus on auditor
238
enforcing the idea that an organization should not be
independence,
performing its own auditing and consulting services.239 Auditing companies
should be separate and independent from their clients.240
The flurry of proposed state legislation in California, Massachusetts, New
York, and Texas, considering or requiring Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosures by
nonprofit organizations, gained the attention of the media as well as U.S.
Senators. In 2004, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing titled Charity
Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good
Charities.241 At the outset of the Hearing, Senator Max Baucus acknowledged
the vital role the charities play in American Society.242 He noted the depth of
assistance ranging from repairing national parks from fires in the west to the
soup kitchens serving the elderly.243 Senators Baucus and Charles Grassley
expressed concern over recent charitable scandals, insufficient transparency,
and inflated salaries.244 Those giving testimony before the Committee
discussed failed boards, mismanagement, industry reform, and reform as

236. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 1983 (citing Reiser, supra note 229, at 562–66, 568, 573
(outlining the legislative history of the New York bill)); Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev.
205, 208–09, 268 (2004)).
237. See Paula Desio, An Overview of the Organizational Guidelines, http://www.ussc.gov/
corp/ORGOVERVIEW.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
238. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT AUDITING STANDARDS § 1.01 (2003),
available at http://www.gao.gov/govaud/yb2003.pdf.
239. Thomas A. McLaughlin, For-Profit Spillover: New Regulation of Independence,
NONPROFIT TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at 14.
240. Id.
241. Charity Oversight and Reform: Keeping Bad Things from Happening to Good Charities:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 1 (2004) [hereinafter Charity Oversight
Hearing].
242. Id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Max Baucus).
243. Id. at 2–3 (opening statement of Hon. Max Baucus).
244. Id. at 1–3.
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applicable to small nonprofits.245 Following several hearings including
testimony from the director of the IRS, state attorneys general, and leaders
from the nonprofit world, some members of Congress sought increased
disclosure from, and oversight of, nonprofits.246 Ultimately, in June 2006, the
Committee passed a series of measures designed to address potential abuses in
the nonprofit sector through increased penalties for political activities,
overvaluation of donations, and top officials engaged in illegal financial
transactions.247
In 2004, the IRS committed to increasing its review of 501(c)(3) agencies’
activities.248 On June 22, 2004, Mark W. Everson, then-Commissioner of the
IRS, testified before the Senate Finance Committee:
I share your view that we must quickly and effectively act now. If these
abuses are left unchecked, I believe there is the risk that Americans not only
will lose faith in and reduce support for charitable organizations, but that the
249
integrity of our tax system also will be compromised.

The Commissioner continued, calling for laws forcing nonprofit organizations
to disclose greater amounts of information:
Disclosure is an important way for the IRS to identify participants in abusive
transactions.
However, our disclosure scheme, which originally was
developed to address the taxable sector, does not yet fit all tax-exempt
participants because the method of reporting does not fit all tax-exempt entities
250
well [since some entities do not have to report under the current scheme].

In addition to the 501(c)(3) status, the IRS requires that certain nonprofits
complete and file the Form 990.251
In response to the nonprofit scandals,252 including the United Way
excessive compensation scandal, in 2005, the IRS adopted new regulations.253

245. Charity Oversight Hearing, supra note 241, at 108th Cong., 2, 7, 9–15, 29, 32–33, 42–58
(2004).
246. Id. at 2; Robert A. Britton, Making Disclosure Regulation Work in the Nonprofit Sector,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 437, 444–48 (2008).
247. Harvy Lipman, Senate Committee Passes New Accountability Rules: Passage of Giving
Incentives Now in Doubt, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY, June 29, 2006, available at
http://philanthropy.com/free/update/2006/06/2006062901.htm.
248. Press Release, IRS, IRS Commissioner Testimony: Charitable Giving Problems and Best
Practices (June 22, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-04-081.pdf.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. IRS, Filing Requirements: Exempt Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,
id=96103,00.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). Religious institutions are not required to file the
Form 990. Id. Donors and members of the public that support these organizations through
contributions are therefore not able to readily determine how these funds are used.
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These new regulations make executives and directors personally liable for
excessive compensation.254 The IRS can also impose immediate sanctions on
nonprofit leaders who provide excess benefits to board members or other
control persons.255 Even more recently, the IRS has designed a new Form 990
for nonprofits.256 This new form will focus on the internal workings of these
organizations and make internal activities more visible to the public—achieved
through the reporting of transactions between board members and officers and
the nonprofit entity.257 These changes have substantially increased the IRS
enforcement presence.
B.

The Voluntary Adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley-Like Measures in the
Nonprofit Sector

Reform often follows destabilizing events, as seen in response to corporate
scandal. But within a few years, following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley,
several large nonprofits, led by the healthcare sector and education companies,
voluntarily adopted various Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosure requirements as
“best practices.”258 Many of these firms perceive benefits of preemptively
adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-type policies in the face of the attention their
industry received from Congress and the IRS.259 Attorney Gerald L. Blanchard
argues:

252. GREENBERG TRAURIG, HOW TO BE A RESPONSIBLE NONPROFIT DIRECTOR: DO’S AND
DON’TS: AVOIDING PUNISHMENT FOR GOOD DEEDS 1 (2005), http://www2.gtlaw.com/pub/
Alerts/2005/1002.pdf.
253. Id.; Press Release, ERI Economic Research Institute, New Rules from IRS: Executives
and Board Members at Nonprofits Personally Liable for Excessive Compensation (Mar. 7, 2005),
http://www.eri-nonprofit-salaries.com/index.cfm?FuseAction=NewsRoom.Dsp_Release&Press
ReleaseID=92 [hereinafter ERI Press Release].
254. ERI Press Release, supra note 253.
255. 26 U.S.C. § 4958 (2006).
256. Press Release, IRS, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations,
Adjusts Filing Threshold to Provide Transition Relief (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=176722,00.html [hereinafter IRS Press Release]; Paul
M. Torgerson & Claire H. Topp, United States: IRS Clarifies Policies on Nonprofit Compliance,
MONDAQ.COM, Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=68618 [hereinafter
Torgerson & Topp].
257. IRS Press Release, supra note 253.
258. A. Nagorski, Sarbanes-Oxley Isn’t Just for Public Firms, INTERNAL AUDITOR, June
2006, at 20, 20; see also Cinda Becker, Transparent Motives: UPMC Blazes Trail for Not-forProfits in Sarbanes-Oxley Compliance, MODERN HEALTHCARE, July 31, 2006, at 28, 28
(discussing the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center’s preemptive Sarbanes-Oxley
“compliance”).
259. See Becker, supra note 258, at 28.
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For example, the nonprofit University of Pittsburgh Medical Center has taken
steps to become SOX certified by its outside auditor. The Fitch ratings service
issued a report in 2005 called “Sarbanes-Oxley and Not-For-Profit Hospitals:
Increased Transparency and Improved Accountability,” in which it encourages
hospitals to adopt SOX standards for corporate governance and financial
transparency. Likewise, Moody’s has issued a special comment called
“Governance of Not-for-Profit Healthcare Organizations,” in which it
discusses how compliance with best corporate governance and financial
accountability practices plays into the rating process for bonds. Thus, the large
nonprofit organizations like hospitals are beginning to adopt SOX-like controls
and systems, even though they are not technically required to do so. Ratings
agencies, accounting firms, and the investment community are beginning to
260
expect that nonprofits will move toward SOX compliance.

The perceived benefits of voluntarily adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-like
policies include increased public confidence in both the individual nonprofit
corporation and the nonprofit sector as a whole, as well as improved internal
accountability among nonprofit directors.261 Some nonprofit directors believe
the application of Sarbanes-Oxley-type disclosure requirements to nonprofit
entities is inevitable and prefer to have the policies in place as a preemptive
measure.262
C. Sarbanes-Oxley as a Required Regulatory Scheme Should Be Restricted to
the Largest Nonprofits
Sarbanes-Oxley applies to the largest corporations, those publicly-traded
and regulated by the SEC.263 Since 2004, these companies, representing more
than 95% of the total U.S. market capitalization, have been subject to all of the
new rules created by Sarbanes-Oxley.264 Large organizations can more easily
invest in the infrastructure to achieve compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley than
publicly-traded small and mid-size corporations.265 And they may need the
regulation more than smaller organizations because large organizations are
vulnerable to mismanagement due to their size as opposed to smaller

260. Blanchard, supra note 192, at 65.
261. See Becker, supra note 258, at 28.
262. See David Wren, Nonprofits Feel Pinch of Firmer Financial Rules, SUN NEWS, Nov. 13,
2006, at 1A (“[M]any auditors and agency directors are holding their groups to Sarbanes-Oxley
standards because Congress has indicated similar accounting laws for nonprofits are inevitable.”).
263. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §806(a), 116 Stat. 745, 802–04
(codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §1514A(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2003)).
264. Charles E. Berg, Testimony Concerning Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors
and Strengthening the Markets, 1579 PLI/CORP 331, 343 (Sept. 19, 2006) (discussing the
testimony by Christopher Cox, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, Before the U.S. House
Committee on Financial Services (Jan. 4–5, 2007).
265. Tamara Loomis, Costs of Compliance Soar After Sarbanes-Oxley, N.Y.L.J., May 1,
2003, at 1.
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organizations that may be vulnerable due to detached governance.266 Further,
financial mismanagement when an organization is not regulated, can be
devastating, as seen with Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom.267 Arguably,
Sarbanes-Oxley has aided in the restoration of investor confidence268 in
publicly-traded companies through, among other measures, transparency and
financial controls.269
Sarbanes-Oxley can similarly benefit the largest nonprofit organizations,
those with assets of $10,000,000 or more (“jumbo nonprofits”).270 In 2005,
jumbo nonprofits represented 1% of nonprofits registered with the IRS and 6%
of the returns filed by nonprofit charitable organizations.271 These nonprofits
account for 90% of the total asset holdings and 83% of the total revenue
reported by nonprofit charitable organizations.272
Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms—if applied to jumbo nonprofits—would be a
rational application of best practices, and would be more likely to achieve the
desired results of transparency and strong governance. This restrained
application of Sarbanes-Oxley would track donor dollars and perhaps public
interest to a larger degree than a broad application of similar reform to all
nonprofits.
D. What About the Little Guy? Doesn’t He Need Reform?
In a recent study of major nonprofit scandals reported between 1995 and
2001, Margaret Gibelman and Sheldon R. Gelman concluded that poor
governance was the principle source of nonprofit scandal.273 Their research

266. GLASS, LEWIS & CO., RESTATEMENTS TREND ALERT: GETTING IT WRONG THE FIRST
TIME 1 (March 2, 2006) (“[T]he smallest companies are where strong internal controls arguably
are needed most, because they are where the risk of restatement is the highest.”) available at
http://www.glasslewis.com/downloads/Restatements2005Summary.pdf.
267. Ann C. Logue, Best Foot Forward: SOX and Financial Standards: Higher Ed Leaders
Come to Terms with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, U. BUS., July 1, 2007, at 76; Erin Massey Everitt,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s Officer Certification Requirements-Has Increased Accountability Equaled
Increased Liability?, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 225, 226–27 (2008) (discussing the impetus of
increased accountability of corporate officers).
268. Andy Serwer, Stop Whining About SarbOx!, FORTUNE, Aug. 7, 2006, at 39 (noting that
the market value of the Wilshire 5000 index, a proxy for all public companies in the U.S.,
increased 54% in the four years after SOX was signed).
269. Loomis, supra note 265, at 1.
270. Bragg, supra note 219, at A1.
271. Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Labor and Agricultural, and other Tax-Exempt
Organizations, 28 STAT. OF INCOME BULL. 270, 271 (2008).
272. Id.
273. Margaret Gibelman & Sheldon R. Gelman, Very Public Scandals: Nongovernmental
Organizations in Trouble, 12 VOLUNTAS: INT’L J. VOLUNTARY & NONPROFIT ORG. 49, 58
(2001).
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found that a lack of oversight and accountability left the nonprofits vulnerable
to exploitation.274
The application of Sarbanes-Oxley-like reform for the nonprofits sector en
masse is ill conceived. The nonprofit sector is heterogeneous.275 As Gerald
Blanchard explains, “Over two-thirds of all 501(c)(3) organizations have less
than $25,000 in gross receipts and represent everything from the
The
school/parent/teacher organizations to local sports leagues.”276
organizations which are not necessarily business-like ventures are less likely to
have savvy boards and should not be squeezed into the for-profit regulatory
mold of Sarbanes-Oxley. Nonprofits have unique attributes that should be
respected as we move toward reform. Reform in this area must be respectful
and innovative in order to accurately value the organizations and their
missions. Before the Senate Finance Committee, Diana Aviv, CEO of
Independent Sector, explained the following:
In the last 25 years, the charitable sector has grown considerably and some of
its leaders are not familiar with good governance practices. The legal
framework has not kept pace with growth, and the diversity of organizations,
and public resources are not sufficient to ensure that laws governing the sector
are properly enforced. The forms 990 and 990 PF filed annually by charities
and foundations too often are inaccurate and inconsistent. These current
challenges do not lend themselves to quick fixes. Changes must be given
277
careful consideration and tested before sector-wide reform is implemented.

The goal of nonprofit reform is to increase the likelihood of the agencies’
positive outcomes in terms of service delivery and mission accomplishment,
while decreasing the opportunity for fraud and mismanagement through
systematic reforms that focus on transparency, independence, ethics, and
honesty.
III. GUIDANCE FOR NONPROFIT REFORM
The wholesale application of Sarbanes-Oxley to the nonprofit sector with
the goals of sound governance, transparency, and accountability is shortsighted
and impracticable. Sarbanes-Oxley-like reform is best suited for the largest
nonprofits, which actually function more like corporations. There are lessons
that all nonprofits can take away from Sarbanes-Oxley.
Strong leadership from the chairman of the board or the executive director
is necessary for proactive nonprofit reform. When leadership is not interested

274. Id.
275. Charity Oversight Hearing, supra note 241, at 44 (statement of Prof. Derek Bok,
President Emeritus, Harvard University).
276. Blanchard, supra note 192, at 59.
277. Charity Oversight Hearing, supra note 241, at 42 (statement of Diana Aviv, President
and CEO, Independent Sector).
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in positive board change reactive reform can be seen in times of crisis such as
the untimely departure of the founder, financial pressures, or ethical problems.
Highly visible moments or transition, stress, or even crisis within an institution
or a board, however traumatic, are particularly promising windows of
opportunity for the chairman of the board or the executive director to initiate
board development efforts.278 Purposeful governance at the board level,
through and by independent directors, is critical to the nonprofit sector.
Committee work should be taken seriously. Those engaged in the work of
shaping the future of the nonprofit should assess the board, its structure, and its
needs. This process should culminate in focused director recruitment and
training. In terms of finances, nonprofit directors should concern themselves
with audits, compensation matters, and executive evaluation. Additionally,
nonprofits should develop and adopt document retention plans, and policies
addressing whistle-blowers, conflicts of interest, codes of ethics, and nepotism.
Nonprofit directors must specifically focus intently on, and, in some
instances, sharpen the mission of their nonprofit. This mission should guide
the nonprofit in defining objectives, conducting daily activities, providing
client services and strategic planning—all aided through decisions of the board
and activities of the staff. A nonprofit adhering to mission-based principles
should be well positioned to seek and train the most qualified directors,
executives, and staff. A nonprofit’s ability to recruit, train, and retain highquality people in key roles is important to the work of the nonprofit in terms of
fundraising and client services.
A.

The Mission as a Template; Enhancing the Duty of Obedience

Nonprofits, irrespective of size, can benefit from a recommitment to their
missions by thinking about recruiting, training, and retaining directors, and
conducting succession planning. The first step for a board is to establish or
reaffirm its mission.279 There are several books on mission-based management
that provide direction on using the mission statement as a template for daily
activities.280 These resources and others provide direction on using the mission
statement as a template to board activities.281 The goal of mission-based

278. RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., IMPROVING THE PERFORMANCE OF GOVERNING BOARDS 21
(1996).
279. MICHAEL ALLISON & JUDE KAYE, STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR NONPROFIT
ORGANIZATIONS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE AND WORKBOOK 68–69 (1997) (discussing how to
formulate a mission statement).
280. PETER C. BRINCKERHOFF, MISSION-BASED MANAGEMENT: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT WORKBOOK (2001); PETER C. BRINCKEROFF, MISSION-BASED MANAGEMENT:
LEADING YOUR NOT-FOR-PROFIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2000); ROGER DILLOW, MISSIONBASED ADVISORY PROGRAMS: A PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT MANUAL (2006).
281. CHAIT, supra note 278, at 131.
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management is to ensure that the agency is carrying out its duties in a manner
that focuses attention on the mission of the organization.282 A one-step
implementation of this principle is to instruct directors to spot check their work
by asking the fundamental question: “Have my actions advanced the mission
of the organization?”283 If responses to this question are not clearly yes, then
the board should reconsider the action. Periodic review of the mission helps to
ensure that newer directors both understand and acknowledge that they are a
part of the articulation of the mission.284
1.

Conducting a Needs Assessment

Once a board has established its mission, there are ways to make sure the
organization utilizes and advances the purpose of this mission. Conducting a
needs assessment is crucial to the board’s ability to do its job and carry out its
mission in a consistent manner.285 Members of the board need to work
together to identify the needs of the nonprofit.286 An organization can assess
its needs and determine its priorities by examining existing data and
conducting attitude surveys, community forums, or focus group interviews.287
Each organization must determine which method will be the most effective and
useful for them.288 Once an organization determines its needs and priorities, it
must establish a plan to further provide methods and strategies to fulfill these
needs.289
This leads the board into the next essential area: Communication.
Informing the community and the organizations stakeholders of the needs of

282. BRINCKEROFF, MISSION-BASED MANAGEMENT, supra note 280, at 43.
283. Id. at 45–47.
284. ABA, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 8 (George W.
Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002).
285. For examples of needs assessments, see Coastal Services Center of the National Oceanic
& Atmospheric Administration, Needs Assessment Training: Organizational Design,
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/needs/section_b-11.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Robert H. Rouda &
Mitchell E. Kusy, Jr., Development of Human Resources: Needs Assessment—The First Step, 78
TAPPI J. 255, 255 (1995); Iowa State University Extension, Needs Assessment Strategies for
Community Groups and Organizations, http://www.extension.iastate.edu/communities/tools/
assess/ [hereinafter Iowa Extension] (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND.
CONFERENCE, THE NEEDS ASSESSMENT: TOOLS FOR LONG-TERM PLANNING 1 (1999), available
at www.campuskitchens.org/kellogg/images/ves/aec_needs_assessment.pdf [hereinafter CASEY
FOUND.].
286. BRINCKEROFF, LEADING YOUR NOT-FOR-PROFIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note
280, at 30–31.
287. Steven V. Steadham, Learning to Select a Needs Assessment Strategy, TRAINING AND
DEV. J., Jan. 1980, at 56, 59.
288. See CASEY FOUND., supra note 285, at 2.
289. Id. at 1.
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the organization in order for it to carry out its mission is crucial.290 Using the
results of the needs assessment and sharing the nonprofit entity’s priorities
with stakeholders is an essential element for the success of community-based
organizations and other nonprofits.291
2.

Communication

Caucusing with stakeholders and engaging in team building is perhaps the
most effective way to communicate the needs and mission of the organization.
Stakeholders are the people who hold an interest in the organization and want
to see it succeed.292 This category includes funders, clients, community
members, local politicians, advocates, those who believe in the mission, and
those who can influence others through social networks or other means to
support the mission.293 When stakeholders know the needs of the organization,
they can provide strategies and incentives to others in order to meet these
needs.
For example, the Social Equity Caucus operating out of California includes
nine Bay Area counties and has met since 1998 “on a quarterly basis to share
information and strategies, network, and develop a unified vision of social
equality for the region.”294 This caucus provides members with a chance to
receive feedback and information from its stakeholders and allows those
members to provide ideas and recommendations for the future.
Team building can strengthen an organization and increase productivity
and dedication to the organization.295 Once a board looks past the simple text
of its mission and works to include the stakeholders of the organization, they
have a better chance to advance this mission. Communicating the mission and
the priorities of a nonprofit entity is essential to fundraising and effective
operations. This communication can be a powerful tool for both external
constituents and employees.

290. BRINCKEROFF, LEADING YOUR NOT-FOR-PROFIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, supra note
280, at 32.
291. Peggy Sasso, Searching for Trust in the Not-For-Profit Boardroom: Looking Beyond the
Duty of Obedience to Ensure Accountability, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1485, 1500 (2003).
292. Mulligan, supra note 130, at 2006.
293. Id.
294. GEORGIANA HERNÁNDEZ, ED.D. & MATTHEW S. FITZGERALD, SOCIAL EQUALITY
CAUCUS EVALUATION AND STRATEGIC PLANNING PROJECT: FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION
STAGE (2007), available at http://iseje.org/downloads/Social%20Equity%20Caucus%20-%20
Evaluation%20EXEC%20SUMMARY.pdf.
295. Center for Management & Organization Effectiveness, Team Building for Skill
Development and High-Performing Teams, http://www.cmoe.com/team-building.html (last
visited Jan. 11, 2010).
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Internal Investment

The next step in advancing an organization’s mission is to take time to
educate the staff and middle management about the mission and the priorities
of the nonprofit entity. The staff and middle management are the face of the
organization and its key communicators.296 Middle managers play a unique
and effective role in a company and can help maintain an organization.297
They are generally good at motivating and boosting the morale of their
employees.298 Adoption of mission-based management is an important step in
the development process and can also play a role in carrying out an
organization’s vision. Treating an employee well, through respect and
involvement, will produce high-quality employees who not only continue to
come to work each day, but also bring a level of commitment to the
organization while they work.299 Employees who understand and support the
organization can be instrumental in advancing the mission.
B.

Recruiting and Retaining Directors

Nonprofit directors do not reap the monetary benefits that they may receive
as for-profit directors, such as dividends or stipends.300 This, coupled with the
public’s growing interest in holding directors legally accountable for poor
decisions, makes the search for willing and capable directors a difficult task.
Recently, judges in Delaware were willing to give less deference to directors’
business decisions.301 Such judicial decisions do not help alleviate the high
demand and low supply of qualified and willing directors.
There are several factors that will attract good, independent candidates.302
A well-articulated mission is important because a director will forward the

296. David Jackson & John Humble, Middle Managers: New Purpose, New Directions, J.
MGMT. DEV., May 1994, at 15, 21; see also Themanager.org, Management Quality—The Role of
the Middle Manager, http://www.themanager.org/Strategy/Middle_Managers.htm (last visited
Jan. 11, 2010).
297. Jackson & Humble, supra note 296, at 15.
298. Id.
299. See Dale Dauten, Take Care of Your Employees; They’ll Take Care of You, BOSTON
GLOBE, Dec. 3, 2006, at G4.
300. M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Nonprofit Purposes and Character Which Warrant
Creation of Nonprofit Corporation, 16 A.L.R.2d 1345 (2004).
301. E. Norman Veasey, Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW.
1447 (2004); See also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003);
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. 295, slip op. at 2 (Del. Dec. 23, 2003); MICHAEL W. PEREGRINE
& JAMES R. SCHWARTZ, DIRECTOR RECRUITMENT AND RETENTION IN A POST-SARBANES
WORLD 1 (2005), available at http://www.lawprofessorblogs.com/taxprof/linkdocs/20053003.pdf.
302. Independent is defined as someone one who is not compensated by the organizations and
is not related to a member of the organizations. Self-regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act
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mission to others in fundraising events. The mission should also be broad
enough for a potential director to accept and support it.303 The candidate will
need to believe their participation will further the mission.304 Another helpful
factor is branding or prestige. This will attract skillful directors because the
corporation’s brand will open doors—professional as well as social. The
candidates for directorship should believe in the leadership and vision of the
CEO. Clearly written expectations and duties will also attract qualified board
members because they will want to work for an organization that is respectful
of their time.305
A necessary step in this process is defining or identifying specific
recruitment needs. The board committee assigned to recruitment should
consider qualifications such as leadership, work ethic, commitment to the
mission, community connections, management style, expertise, other
commitments, and demographics.306 The board should have an attorney for his
reasoning skills, an accountant for her financial skills, and a specialist from the
field in which nonprofit corporation deals. For example, if the nonprofit
corporation is a hospital, the board should have a physician and a health care
administrator. The board committee for recruitment can use a “recruiting
matrix” to evaluate the board as it exists and to identify gaps in desired
characteristics. Not only do some nonprofit websites have such matrices,307
but there are professional recruitment firms that offer evaluation and
recruitment strategies.308
Another way to attract board members is to offer all possible precautions
against personal liability. The board should give copies of the Director and
Officer (“D&O”) insurance policy to candidates. They should offer the

Release No. 48,745 (Nov. 4, 2003). In establishing the test for independence, the same questions
should be asked to those that live with the potential director. See id.
303. Jennifer Bol et al., Attracting the New Breed of Nonprofit Directors, in POINT OF VIEW:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SPECIAL ISSUE 27 (July 2004), available at http://content.spencer
stuart.com/sswebsite/pdf/lib/POV%20Issue%201,%202004.pdf.
304. Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does the Structure and Composition of the
Board Matter? The Case of Nonprofit Organizations, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 208 (2005).
305. Bol et al., supra note 303, at 31.
306. Id. at 27.
307. Recruiting matrices can help a board establish techniques and methods for acquiring the
best and most effective board. Establishing one that the organization follows and utilizes as a
recruiting tool will only strengthen the longevity of a board and its members. See, e.g., LISC,
STRATEGIC BOARD RECRUITMENT: A KEY TO BUILDING A DYNAMIC BOARD 14–18 (2005),
available at http://www.lisc.org/docs/experts/2005/eo_12_14_2005.pdf.
308. See e.g., Board Source, Improve the Effectiveness of Your Board, http://www.board
source.org/Workshops.asp?ID=40 (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
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maximum amount of indemnification available by law.309 The board should
divulge gaps in coverage and help the director fill in the gaps.310 Finally, the
board should assure renewal of the D&O policy.
The board can assure its own quality by recruiting the best and the
brightest. New and talented board members come equipped with naïve
questions and energy. These unique resources motivate the board as a whole
and may lead the board to question its method of operations.311 The
opportunity to work with qualified and competent directors will benefit
recruitment and retention. An effective code of ethics, clearly defined duties,
and annual evaluations will assist in maintaining the board’s quality. New
directors should go through orientation and training. To increase new board
member investment in the nonprofit, they should be given options in defining
their role in the nonprofit. For example, they should be able to choose between
a variety of committees, advisory boards, and/or executive board positions.312
Compensation is an effective recruiting method, and the nonprofit may
consider compensating its board members.313 The board, however, should be
careful with respect to the compensation of members.314 It is also important
for the corporation to abide by the laws of the state of incorporation and IRS
rules and regulations. Given the complexities in compensating board
members, it may not be wise to compensate board members if doing so would

309. ABA, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 262 (George W.
Overton & Jeannie Carmedelle Frey eds., 2d ed. 2002).
310. Id.
311. Naïve but useful questions can include the following: What is on the agenda for this
meeting? Why do we need to complete this form? Can I take a look at the balance sheet?
312. Bol, supra note 303, at 30.
313. See RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 86–87.
314. Evelyn Brody, The Board of Nonprofit Organizations: Puzzling through the Gaps
Between Law and Practice, 76 FDMLR 521, 544 n.104 (2007) (citing In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006)). One issue in Disney addressed whether only the full
board, rather than just the compensation committee, could set the financial terms of the contract
with incoming president Michael Ovitz. Compensation can be a sensitive topic for many exempt
organizations, particularly charities, and the visibility of the Form 990 suggests that the full board
at least should be aware of the compensation it pays to directors, officers, and top executives
before the public.); Comm. to Save Adelphi v. Diamandopoulos § I. (Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
N.Y. Feb. 10, 1997); Vacco v. Diamandopoulos, 715 N.Y.S.2d 269, 270 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998);
Alec Macgillis, The Princely Habits of College Presidents, BALT. SUN, Oct. 2, 2005, at 1F
(discussing the spending habits of four university presidents); see ABA COORDINATING COMM.
ON NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE, GUIDE TO NONPROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE WAKE
OF SARBANES-OXLEY 45 (2005); see also Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Orgs. § 330 cmt.
b(1), reporter’s notes 1–6 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); Ralph E. DeJong & Michael W.
Peregrine, Director Compensation Plans for Nonprofit: Addressing the Key Legal Issues, 30
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 29 (2000).
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mean abdicating nonprofit status.315 A complex decision such as this one is a
reason to find, recruit, and retain competent directors.
C. Training Directors
Once the board attracts qualified directors, it is crucial to train them.
Maintaining a quality board will help recruit and retain the best directors. The
first opportunity to train new directors is during recruiting. The candidate will
learn about the mission and the organization during this time, and they will
learn about certain risks and duties of directorship in the nonprofit arena.
The next best opportunity for training is orientation.316 The new board
member should be given two manuals.317 One manual should contain relevant
information that they may leave at home.318 Relevant information consists of,
at a minimum, a history of the corporation, the corporation’s structure, its
culture, and sample documents for proxies.319 The other should contain
information that they may need to reference at meetings, such as the charter,
bylaws, proper meeting procedure, the current mission statement, a list of other
directors, and the organization’s annual calendar of events.320
There are other ways to engage and train directors. One way to engage and
train directors is to hold annual retreats. Annual retreats can renew individual
commitment to the organization and its mission. They can act like extended
board meetings to further an agenda. Also, retreats enhance relationships and
build personal rapport. Another method to engage and train directors is to hold
training sessions. If funding permits, the board should consider hiring experts
on a short-term basis to conduct training. Additionally, there are many state
and federally-sponsored training classes that focus on board development and
director duties. A third, and highly successful method of engaging and training
directors, is to create a board mentoring program.321 Additionally, boards
should consider adopting a continuing board education requirement. If the
board adopts such a requirement, both new and old members would be
required to attend a certain number of hours of training each year. Continuous
training teaches board members new skills and reinforce best practices.

315. See RUNQUIST, supra note 53, at 86–87 (discussing that charities can have their taxexempt status revoked for giving a prohibited benefit to a person).
316. ABA, supra note 309, at 229.
317. Id. at 230.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 230–31.
320. Id. at 230.
321. Bol et al., supra note 303, at 31.
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D. Executive Succession—A Missing Link, Transitions, and Looking Toward
the Future
Attracting and maintaining an educated and contributing board is
imperative. In addition to the legal duties of nonprofit boards, there are several
areas where the board’s work is required. Numerous articles discuss
fundraising as a role of the board.322 Less attention, however, has been given
to one of the board’s most important functions: continuous investment in
succession planning. While experience can, of course, be of great value in
board service, this very strong emphasis on retention raises concerns about
possible entrenchment and poor succession planning.323 Assuming that
nonprofit boards—already undercompensated and overworked—can keep
nonprofits afloat, in compliance with applicable laws, and well funded,
executive succession often threatens nonprofit organizations as the next major
hurdle.324
Executive Director succession is one of the leading causes of nonprofit
failure in terms of providing services.325 Succession planning should be
considered by the board as well as the executive staff of the organization. The
development of any succession plan should be an evolutionary process from
which organizational strengths and weaknesses can be identified and
addressed, if necessary.
E.

Making the Most of Sarbanes-Oxley

Borrowing some of the principles from Sarbanes-Oxley could prove
effective for nonprofits. Specifically, the requirements of certification, an
independent audit committee, and internal controls, as required by SarbanesOxley, could help nonprofits run more effectively, sustain a healthy
corporation, and fulfill their mission statement.

322. See, e.g., David O. Renz, Nonprofit Governance and the Work of the Board, MIDWEST
CENTER FOR NONPROFIT LEADERSHIP (2007) available at http://www.bsbpa.umkc.edu/
mwcnl/board%20resources/Gov%20&%20bd%20work%20Renz%20paper%20rev.pdf;
Steve
Thompson, Nonprofit Fundraising: the Role of the Board of Directors, ASSOCIATED CONTENT,
Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/66690/nonprofit_fundraising_the_role_
of_the.html.
323. RUEL & HODGSON, supra note 98, at 12.
324. See Joseph Santora et al., Succession in Nonprofit Organizations: An Insider/Outsider
Perspective, 72 S.A.M. 26, 26 (2007).
325. See generally Joseph C. Santora & James C. Sarros, CEO Succession in Nonprofit
Community Based Organizations, in CAREER DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL 107 (2001).
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Certification

Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the Chief Executive Officer and the Chief
Financial Officer (or their equivalent) certify financial records.326 The
signatures on these statements by those who are in charge of overseeing these
records further certify the accuracy and importance of the documents. Having
the directors or those in charge of the financial records acknowledge the
accuracy of the statements will aid nonprofits with financial accountability and
transparency.
2.

Independent Audit Committee

Nonprofits could benefit from enhanced audit oversight through the work
of an independent audit committee. If an auditor is too close to the inner
workings of the organization, it will be hard to maintain control and remain
objective.327 A nonprofit, using an independent audit committee, would have
an effective way to remain in control and have an objective point-of-view,
ensuring a good financial process able to detect and perhaps prevent financial
mismanagement.
3.

Internal Controls

While it is important for an organization to have an independent audit
system, it is also very useful to establish internal controls of an organization.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) has established
its own set of internal operations to evaluate their financial auditing
methods.328 The PCAOB focuses on evaluating several areas, such as
identifying the risks to integrity and effectiveness of programs, implementing
ways to improve in the area of integrity and effectiveness, keeping reports of
the performance and finances, examining and following laws that apply,
implementing safeguards and utilizing resources, and continually protecting
and promoting the integrity and efficiency of the organization and its auditing
measures.329 It would be useful for a nonprofit to follow the lead of the
PCAOB and establish an effective method for internal control, including but
not limited to, policies, practices of self-examination, and internal guidelines

326. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
327. Donald K. McConnell, Jr. & George Y. Banks, How Sarbanes-Oxley Will Change the
Audit Process, J. ACCT., Sept. 2003, at 49, 49.
328. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, Internal Oversight, http://www.pcao
bus.org/ABout_the_PCAOB/Internal_Oversight/index.aspx (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
329. Id.
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for processes. There are many sites a nonprofit can use to help them develop
and maintain internal controls.330
As a summary, Chart 1 in Appendix A groups nonprofit organizations
according to asset size and recommends appropriate adaptations of SarbanesOxley. These adaptations, if found to be desirable practices, should be added
to the current nonprofit manuals, charters, and bylaws.
CONCLUSION
Nonprofits who adopt procedures and rules similar to those required by
Sarbanes-Oxley in the for-profit context will not pass a litmus test for
appropriate governance. Yet, implementing certain measures makes it more
likely that directors and the executive staff are asking the right questions,
making it more likely than not that the appropriate actions will be taken. The
call for stringent Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms in the nonprofit sector is overly
broad. The potential reforms fail to recognize the distinctions between various
types of nonprofits and, as a result, attempt to force corporate reforms onto
nonprofit organizations.
Revisiting the stories of John and Jeff, strong training and orientation for
Jeff would empower him to carry out his legal duties while monitoring and
managing the nonprofit organization. A knowledgeable and engaged nonprofit
board has a better chance of ensuring that the organization’s mission is carried
out and that clients like John receive the care they deserve.

330. See, e.g., Softrax, Do You Have Internal Control of Your Revenue?, http://www.soft
rax.com/mk/get/sox404checklist_ppc?utm_content=sox_business_controls_sarbanes_oxley_audit
_dynamic (last visited Jan. 11, 2010); Business Owner’s Toolkik, Establishing Internal Controls,
http://www.toolkit.com/small_business_guide/sbg.aspx?nid=P04_8260 (last visited Jan. 11,
2010); State Bar of Texas, How to Establish Internal Controls, http://www.texasbarcle.com/cle/
site/LawOfficeMgmtBrochures/Controls.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 2010).
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APPENDIX A
Chart 1: Suggested Methods of Implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley Based on Size of
Nonprofit
SOX
Requirements
for reporting
companies331

1. Auditing332

Jumbo
Nonprofit
(in excess of
$10,000,000
in assets)

Auditor
independence
is required.

Auditor
independence
is required.

Large
Nonprofits
($1,000,000
to
$10,000,000
in assets)

Auditor
independence
is required.

Medium
Nonprofits
($100,000 to
$1,000,000 in
assets)

Small
Nonprofits
(less than
$100,000 in
assets)

The board
should have an
audit
committee and
should recruit
board
members with
expertise in
the areas of
accounting
and auditing.
The audit
committee
should work
closely with
accounting
professionals.
Procedures
should be set
up to detect
fraud.

The board
should obtain
training
regarding
financial
matters for all
board
members. If
possible the
board should
have a
separate
person or
volunteer
within the
organizations
to maintain the
financial
records.
Hiring an
auditor might
be cost
prohibitive.

331. See Paul Arnsberger, Charities, Labor and Agricultural, and Other Tax-Exempt
Organizations, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN (2008) (providing the numbers for this chart).
332. Auditing under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is “an examination of the financial statements of
any issuer by an independent public accounting firm in accordance with the rules of the Board or
the Commission (or, for the period preceding the adoption of applicable rules of the Board under
section 103, in accordance with then-applicable generally accepted auditing and related standards
for such purposes), for the purpose of expressing an opinion on such statements.” SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 2, 116 Stat. 745, 747 (2002).
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Jumbo
Nonprofit
(in excess of
$10,000,000
in assets)

SOX
Requirements
for reporting
companies331

2. Corporate
Responsibility333

a. Director
Independence

Directors
should not
have material
relationships
with the
organization.

Directors
should not
have material
relationships
with the
organization.

Large
Nonprofits
($1,000,000
to
$10,000,000
in assets)

Directors
should not
have material
relationships
with the
organization.
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Medium
Nonprofits
($100,000 to
$1,000,000 in
assets)

Small
Nonprofits
(less than
$100,000 in
assets)

Directors
should try to
steer away
from material
relationships.
However,
there is the
possibility that
directors may
have material
relationships
with the
agency. These
relationships
should be
formally
disclosed to
the directors
and the
director should
indicate that
the material
relationship
will not inhibit
his fiduciary
duties.

Directors
might wear
many hats in
small
organizations.
It is very
possible that
only
interested,
nonindependent
persons are
available for
board service.
Directors may
have material
relationships
with the
agency. These
relationships
should be
formally
disclosed to
the directors
and the
director should
indicate that
the material
relationship
will not inhibit
his fiduciary
duties.

333. Corporate responsibility” is not an easily defined phrase because it means different
things for different companies today. See Mallen Baker, Corporate Social Responsibility—What
Does it Mean?, http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/definition.html (last visited Jan. 11,
2010); Maggi S. Hill, Corporate Social Responsibility–The Responsible Thing to Do, MERCER
BUS., May 1, 2007, at 6; NYSE Euronext, Listed Company Manual, § 303A.00-01: Corporate
Governance Standards and Independent Directors (2009), available at http://nyse
manual.nyse.com/LCM/Sections; NASDAQ OMX, NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, IM 5605:
Definition of Independence—Rule 5605(a)(2) (2009), available at http://nasdaq.cchwall
street.com.
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Jumbo
Nonprofit
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$10,000,000
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Large
Nonprofits
($1,000,000
to
$10,000,000
in assets)

239

Medium
Nonprofits
($100,000 to
$1,000,000 in
assets)

Small
Nonprofits
(less than
$100,000 in
assets)
The board
committee
should serve
as a liaison
from the board
to the staff.
Committees
should cover
finance,
human
resources,
audit, and
budget. There
will be
instances
where the
board will
need staff to
sit on the
committees.
Committee
rules and
responsibilities
should be
established.
Independent,
non-interested
board
members may
not be
available for
committee
service.
Have a
statement by
your nonprofit
that
establishes
what you
believe
corporate
governance
should entail
for your
nonprofit.

b. Committees

The board
should have a
number of
committees.
These
committees
should be
comprised of
independent
directors and
should have
charters
publicly
available.
Each
committee
should have
governing
standards.

The board
should have a
number of
committees.
These
committees
should be
comprised of
independent
directors and
should have
charters
publicly
available.
Each
committee
should have
governing
standards.

The board
should have a
number of
committees.
These
committees
should be
comprised of
independent
directors and
should have
charters
publicly
available.
Each
committee
should have
governing
standards.

The board
committee
should serve
as a liaison
from the board
to the staff.
Committees
should cover
finance,
human
resources,
audit, and
budget. There
will be
instances
where the
board will
need staff to
sit on the
committees.
Committee
rules and
responsibilities
should be
established.

c. Governance

Have a
statement by
your
nonprofit that
establishes
what you
believe
corporate
governance
should entail
for your
nonprofit.

Have a
statement by
your
nonprofit that
establishes
what you
believe
corporate
governance
should entail
for your
nonprofit.

Have a
statement by
your
nonprofit that
establishes
what you
believe
corporate
governance
should entail
for your
nonprofit.

Have a
statement by
your nonprofit
that
establishes
what you
believe
corporate
governance
should entail
for your
nonprofit.
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d. Code of
Ethics

3. Financial
Matters

Disclose
whether a
code of
ethics has or
has not been
adopted.

Matters that
significantly
impact the
financial
statements
should be
disclosed and
financial
statements
must be
certified.

Ethical
guidelines
should be
aspirational
and
disseminated
throughout
the agency.
Leadership
from the
board
regarding
ethics can set
the tone for
ethical
behavior.

Matters that
significantly
impact the
financial
statements
should be
disclosed to
funders and
other
stakeholders.
These
statements
should be
certified by
an
independent
financial
auditor and
the CEO.

Large
Nonprofits
($1,000,000
to
$10,000,000
in assets)
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Medium
Nonprofits
($100,000 to
$1,000,000 in
assets)

Small
Nonprofits
(less than
$100,000 in
assets)

Ethical
guidelines
should be
aspirational
and
disseminated
throughout
the agency.
Leadership
from the
board
regarding
ethics can set
the tone for
ethical
behavior.

Ethical
guidelines
should be
aspirational
and
disseminated
throughout the
agency.
Leadership
from the board
regarding
ethics can set
the tone for
ethical
behavior and
ensure that the
code is
manageable
and visible.

Ethical
guidelines
should be
aspirational
and
disseminated
throughout the
agency.
Leadership
from the board
regarding
ethics can set
the tone for
ethical
behavior and
ensure that the
code is
manageable
and visible.

Matters that
significantly
impact the
financial
statements
should be
disclosed to
funders and
other
stakeholders.
These
statements
should be
certified by
an
independent
financial
auditor and
the CEO.

Matters that
will impact
financial
statements
should be
shared with
the board by
the CEO and
the CFO.
When
problems
regarding cash
flow or
funding are
discussed, a
financial
professional
should be
engaged to
lead the
discussion and
to provide
assistance in
resolution.
These matters
should be
shared with
funders.

The CFO
should make
periodic
reports to the
Board
regarding the
financial status
of the
organization.
Matters that
will adversely
impact the
financial
health of the
organization
should be
addressed with
the board as
soon as
practicable.
The board
should
communicate
financial
concerns to
funders and
seek outside
assistance.

